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Abstract
The river’s gentle roar comes from many quiet drops of water.
—from Hermann Hesse’s Siddhartha.
Distributed denial of service attacks (or DDoS) are a common occurrence on the internet and are becoming more intense as
the bot-nets, used to launch them, grow bigger. Preventing or stopping DDoS is not possible without radically changing the
internet infrastructure; various DDoS mitigation techniques have been devised with different degrees of success. All mitigation
techniques share the need for a DDoS detection mechanism.
DDoS detection based on traffic self-similarity estimation is a relatively new approach which is built on the notion that undis-
turbed network traffic displays fractal like properties. These fractal like properties are known to degrade in presence of abnormal
traffic conditions like DDoS. Detection is possible by observing the changes in the level of self-similarity in the traffic flow at the
target of the attack.
Existing literature assumes that DDoS traffic lacks the self-similar properties of undisturbed traffic. We show how existing bot-
nets could be used to generate a self-similar traffic flow and thus break such assumptions. We then study the implications of
self-similar attack traffic on DDoS detection.
We find that, even when DDoS traffic is self-similar, detection is still possible. We also find that the traffic flow resulting from the
superimposition of DDoS flow and legitimate traffic flow possesses a level of self-similarity that depends non-linearly on both
relative traffic intensity and on the difference in self-similarity between the two incoming flows.
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Part I
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Chapter 1
Background
The objective of our research is to study the feasibility of “Distributed Denial of Service” (or DDoS) detection by measuring
changes in the self-similarity of network traffic, under the condition that both legitimate and attack traffic display self-similar
properties.
Informally, DDoS is an umbrella term used to describe a family of abnormal network conditions. The two defining characteristics
of DDoS are its “distributed” nature and the degraded network service functionality that is its outcome. As the name implies,
DDoS can lead to complete unavailability of the targeted services. In our research we will focus our attention on flooding-type
subset of DDoS, which is arguably the “hardest” class of DDoS to prevent and to mitigate. Flooding DDoS exploits statelessness
of the internet routing infrastructure and a large number of vulnerable network hosts to deliver an overwhelming amount of
undesired traffic to the target of the attack.
Our research is inspired by the work on “loss of self-similarity” [AM04] and “error detection using self-similarity” [SM01].
These papers discuss the effects of disturbing normal traffic flow with either DDoS traffic or packet loss. In both cases the
observed effect is degradation in the natural self-similarity present in network traffic. Changes in self-similarity of network
traffic make detection of DDoS possible.
Self-similarity is a scale invariance property typical of fractals. In the context of network engineering it enables us to construct
simple traffic models and possesses the attractive property of not requiring invasive traffic analysis for its estimation. For instance:
recording the time-series of traffic intensity (sampled at a given frequency) is enough to estimate self-similarity. This is a notable
advantage compared to analysis techniques that require accessing a packets’ header or content.
Because of its flooding nature, DDoS increases the number of packets to be analysed. Therefore self-similarity estimation, with
its lower “per-packet data collection cost”, is an attractive technique. The low statistics collection overhead of self-similarity
estimation could enable embedding DDoS detection solutions in high speed network infrastructure equipment where computation
resources are committed almost entirely to routing.
Existing papers on DDoS detection via self-similarity estimation are based on the assumption that the DDoS traffic is not self-
similar. However, from the review of existing literature and the analysis of software tools used to mount DDoS attacks, it can be
inferred that these tools are capable of generating a self-similar flow of packets.
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Our question then becomes: if both legitimate and malicious traffic display self-similar characteristics, is detection of a DDoS
still possible? In other words, we want to establish how the legitimate and malicious traffic flow contribute to the self-similar
characteristics of the resulting traffic as seen by the target in an hypothetical DDoS attack.
In this chapter we introduce concepts and notions used throughout the research project. The nature of Distributed denial of
service attacks is explained and two possible taxonomies to organize them are described. In order to understand how DDoS
attacks are mounted we also outline the design, life-cycle and features of Bot-nets.
Self-similarity is another central concept in this research which is introduced in Section 1.2; its uses in the context of network
engineering and its role in DDoS detection are further explained in the following sections.
1.1 Distributed denial of service
Informally,Distributed denial of service (or DDoS) is an umbrella term used to describe a family of abnormal network conditions.
The two defining characteristics of DDoS are its distributed nature and the degraded service availability that is its outcome. As
the name implies DDoS can lead to the unavailability of services offered over the network.
The distributed nature of a DDoS distinguishes it from other types of Denial of Service or DoS. DoS can be used to indicate any
abnormal condition that results in a degradation of a service offered over the network; in this sense DoS is a superset of DDoS.
A simple fictional example of non-network related DoS follows: imagine a post office run by a single very diligent, but not very
bright, clerk. The clerk will process customers in strict order and will call the next customer only when the current customer
is satisfied and does not have any more requests. Now, imagine the village prankster queuing up at the post office early in the
morning. The prankster will ask the clerk to carry out a simple task, like selling him a single stamp for instance, every time the
clerk offers to help him. By the end of the working day no one standing in the queue after the prankster will have had access to
the post office services.
Of course in real life the clerk would quickly realize what is happening. Failing that, the prankster would be removed from the
queue by an angry mob. However, in a silicon world the example above is not too far from reality.
Denial of service attacks are not simple to classify because of the variety of situations and modes in which they can occur. A
classic approach to building a taxonomy of DoS can be found in [Shi08] where attacks are classified by a 4-tuple (method, effect,
consumed resource, resource location). Using this framework our fictional example would be classified as (exploiting clerk’s
lack of memory, queue stalled, clerk, post office).
A less orthodox approach can be found in [Cam05] where the author uses a dance-floor metaphor to group DoS types depending
on how they interact with other dance partners (the actors) on the dance floor (the network). This approach has the advantage
of highlighting the relationships between the parties involved in a DoS. Within this framework our fictional example would fall
under the partner subtree (see Figure 1.1) because the clerk, who unwittingly participates in the practical joke, dances with the
prankster to the exclusion of others.
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Inundate victim?
Victim participates?
Y
Direct attack?
N
Partner subtree
Y
Flood subtree
N
Trip subtree
Y
Intervene subtree
N
Figure 1.1: Trunk of the “DDoS dance” taxonomy comprising the first three levels of the hierarchy is reproduced here from
[Cam05].
In our research we are interested in DDoS belonging to the flood subtree in Figure 1.1, in particular we focus our attention on the
subversion tools and on the web sit-in categories (using the terminology from [Cam05], see Figure 1.2) or DDoS-TE using the
terminology from [AM04].
One attacker?
Unwitting helpers?
Y
Legitimate?
N
Spoof?
Y
Pure flood
N
Web sit-in
Y
Web riot
N
Subversion tools
Y
Echo
N
Figure 1.2: Flooding subtree branch for the “DDoS dance” taxonomy. “One attacker” should be interpreted as: one attacker
potentially controlling multiple software agents. Reproduced here from [Cam05].
Subversion tools are programs that allow a person other than the rightful owner to remotely control a network connected machine.
They can disguise as harmless applications that the legitimate user installs, in which case they are called trojan applications, or
they are installed and gain access to the machine exploiting one or more security vulnerabilities of the operating system or
applications already running on the system; worms and viruses fall in this category. In some cases subversion tools are installed
using social engineering to exploit flaws in security policies and security related processes. An instance of exploit falling within
the latter category consists in infecting portable media like CD-ROM (disk proper or image files) or thumb drives and using
unwitting human vectors to bring malware inside a computer system, bypassing the challenges involved in exploiting remote
vulnerabilities altogether.
Web sit-in as used in [Cam05] refers to a large number of distinct users overloading the target with requests with the intention
of degrading its functionality. It is possible for a number of users to overwhelm a service with requests even if there was no
intention to cause harmful side-effects, for instance: en-mass opening of a news website to read about in important article. We
prefer the wider term flash crowd to web sit-in because the former includes both ill-intentioned and accidental flooding scenarios.
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DDoS-TE, short for DDoS traffic exploits, is another term that encompasses both the flash crowd and the subversion tools classes
of DoS. In [AM04] DDoS-TE is defined as “a DoS attack whose effectiveness depends on a continuing stream of attack traffic”.
DDoS-TE exploits the network infrastructure to overwhelm the target with traffic or requests. The attack succeeds when either
the computing power or bandwidth available to the target host is exhausted or heavily taxed.
DDoS-TE are hard to mitigate because their success does not depend on weaknesses of the network infrastructure or on flaws in
the design of the target system to succeed, but on a more basic principle: strength in numbers. One could consider DDoS-TE the
worst case scenario DoS attack: even if the target service is free from weak points, it is still vulnerable to this type of attacks. All
that is required for the attacker to succeed is to control a great number of network hosts.
1.1.1 Botnets and DDos
Mounting a DDoS attack requires controlling a large number of hosts. Gaining control of hosts is achieved by compromising
them with malicious software. These hosts, also known as agents, can be then instructed to generate traffic on the behalf of the
attacker.
Compromising hosts can be achieved exploiting any local or remote vulnerability. The most common scenario is: an existing
exploit vector is used to plant the malicious payload in the host. The vector has the sole function of bypassing the security of the
target host and plays no further role in the DDoS attack. The payload instead will determine the nature of the DDoS.
Design UseCompromise
Attack
Improve
Re-design
Compromise
Figure 1.3: A botnet’s life-cycle.
Whichever way the hosts have been compromised by an attacker, the end result is one or more rogue processes running on each
agent. These processes generally have the following features: hide or obfuscate their presence, listen to instructions from the
attacker and execute their requests. Coordinating a large number of agents is a challenging task, so it is natural to expect tools
being developed to aid the attacker.
The set of compromised hosts is called botnet (short for [ro]bot-net[work]); usually the botnet is further identified by preceding
it with the name of the tool used to control it or with the name of the payload (or sometimes vector) used to compromise the
hosts. For instance the Storm Botnet takes its name from the name of the Storm worm (payload) which is responsible for its
functionality.
Once a host becomes part of a botnet it can then be used for a number of purposes, for instance: send unsolicited emails en-mass,
mount a DDoS attack or to click on advertisement for profit. It is important to understand how an host, once compromised, can
be remotely commandeered to perform any task including, but not limited to, the tasks a legitimate user may carry out.
There are, at any given point in time, a number different active botnets (see [DZL06]). Generally they are not controlled by the
same person or group. Different botnets compete for control of vulnerable hosts because the value or effectiveness of a botnet
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grows with the number hosts it is comprised of. Agents become part of a botnet when infected and leave it when malware is
removed thus requiring continuous work on the attacker’s part to keep the number agents in a botnet at least constant.
The presence of agents is usually discovered only, if at all, after the DDoS attack has begun. Careful monitoring of network
activity can facilitate early detection. The measurable side-effect of a DDoS are an increased usage of bandwidth and compu-
tational resources. It is of course in the interest of the attacker to consume as little of the agent’s resources as possible to avoid
detection. With botnets reaching sizes of tens of thousands agents [Sch06] it is possible for attackers to combine small (and
hardly detectable) traffic flows from each agent into an overwhelming traffic torrent at the target.
Security researchers do not have access to the source code for DDoS generation tools but rely on executable code recovered from
compromised hosts to analyze botnets and infer their design. DDoS tools are in continuous evolution so the results of black box
testing and disassembly on an instance of a DDoS payload can quickly become outdated.
In recent years a number of DDoS payloads have been isolated. Attack payload are recovered using honeypot systems: carefully
monitored network hosts purposely setup to be easily infected (see [McC03]). By analysing the payloads a number of common
features of botnets have been found (see [Cha02] for an overview). These features include: the use of encryption to conceal
communications between the attacker and the agents, some form of authentication to restrict access to the botnet only to its
masters, multiple tier command and control hierarchy.
Simple encryption is employed to evade detection. The need to keep an agent’s resource consumption to the minimum and reduce
the payload’s footprint drives the choice of encryption algorithm. The goal of the attacker is to protect against detection by casual
packet inspection and avoid easy recovery of the authentication credentials, so simple encryption is adequate.
Authentication is necessary to control access to the botnet. The value of a botnet is proportional to its size because the cost of
building a botnet is is dominated by the time taken to identify potentially vulnerable hosts, craft attack vectors and compromise
them. The effectiveness of a botnet is also related to its size: the greater the number of hosts in a botnet the higher the volume of
traffic that can be generated by its agents. It follows that, for an attacker, it is important to restrict access to a botnet to make up
for its cost.
Attacker
Handler Handler
Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent
Target
Figure 1.4: 3-tiers botnet. The attacker controls agents indirectly via an handlers tier.
Multiple tier command and control hierarchy (see Figure 1.4) is employed by botnets primarily to distribute bandwidth and
workload but it also makes the identification of the attacker more difficult and reduces the likelihood of detection. In multiple
tier hierarchies, agents in a botnet are assigned different roles. The role of an agent determines its position in the botnet’s chain
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of command. By having multiple layers (or ranks) the amount of traffic necessary to distribute instructions from a single attacker
down to the lower level agents can be programmatically bounded. The agents used as middle tiers will not partecipate in the
flooding reducing the total maximum throughput of the botnet.
One of these botnets, called Shaft, well represents DDoS generation tools. An analysis of its design and functionality is available
in [DLD00]. Shaft uses simple encryption to evade detection and authentication to restrict access to its infrastructure. It also
features the typical multi tier hierarchy of agents like many other botnets.
Each agent in a Shaft botnet exposes the following traffic generation parameters: burst duration, packet size, packet type. Burst
duration controls the length of the time period in which the agent generates traffic. Packet size controls the size of each packet
generated. Packet type selects which protocol ID is used in the packet’s header: UDP, TCP, ICMP. Shaft does not allow to control
other details of the packet header or its content; a different packet template is used for each one of the previous three choices.
An interesting feature of Shaft is the ability of agents to report statistics on packet generation to their parent agents, this is
conceivably aimed at tuning the attack parameters dynamically and constitute one of many evolutionary improvements security
researchers find in each new generation of these tools.
Security researchers predict growth of botnets in size and expect DDoS tools to undergo evolutionary changes as they are refined
to bypass intrusion detection and packet filtering systems.
1.1.2 DDoS detection techniques
Intentional DDoS is different in nature from other types of attacks on network security as it does not attempt to exploit design
flaws in the target’s system architecture or software, instead it leverages asymmetry in numbers between attacker and target to
increase request rate or traffic flow towards the victim(s) beyond their ability to cope.
The ability to setup a DDoS against a given target depends mainly on two factors: the availability of unsecured personal computers
connected to the internet and on the design of packet routing in Internet Protocol (IP) based networks.
DDoS and IP networks
IP based networks like the internet scale well to large sizes because the cost of routing packets does not grow with the size of the
network. This is thanks to the stateless nature of routing decision in the IP infrastructure; in other words: routers in an IP network
do not store per packet or per connection information, instead each packet is forwarded based solely on the information available
in its header. DDoS takes advantage of this to inundate the target with packet that are not part of a meaningful conversation
between two network endpoints. The success of the internet, at least from the technical standpoint, is rooted in the stateless
routing property of its nodes. For this reasons changing the architecture of the internet to prevent DDoS is not desirable.
DDoS and unsecured hosts
At a high level of abstraction DDoS traffic traverses three major network domains: the source ISPs networks, the core network
and the target’s ISP network.
Pressuring the owners of unsecured network agents to improve their security is a long term solution to the problem that assumes
good will and requires commitment of resources by parties (trojan infected users and source-end ISPs) that are not (or only
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marginally) affected by the DDoS they unwillingly participate in. Such solutions require widespread adoption of policies that
cannot be easily imposed onto ISPs and end users due to the transnational nature of the internet and it is therefore considered to
be outside the scope of this research.
Different technological solution target one or more of these network domains. Some are designed to stop the surge of DDoS
traffic at the source in the origin’s ISP network other solutions call for improvement of the core network routers and other
techniques are designed to be deployed in the vicinity of the victim’s servers.
Solutions that target the source ISP network and the core network require widespread adoption and investment in areas with little
economic incentive for improvement.
On the other hand a potential victim of DDoS has an economic incentive to implement some form of defense and has control
on a small portion of the network: directly in their datacenter and indirectly on their upstream ISP. Techniques designed to be
deployed in the vicinity of the victim’s servers are more likely to be implemented in the short term. We call these techniques:
target-end indicating the portion of the network close to the target system, possibly extending upstream to include the target’s
ISPs network.
Different target-end DDoS mitigation techniques have been proposed in the last few years (see [KLCC06], [MR05], [XLS01],
[WZS04], [TV03], [CS05]) claiming different degree of success in limiting the impact of an attack.
Proposed DDoS mitigation techniques can, in general, be broken down in a number of abstract operational blocks: DDoS traffic
detector, packet classifier, packet filter, controller. DDoS mitigation solutions differ in the number, nature and placement, in the
network, of these operational blocks.
For instance a traceback based technique (see [LLY05]) may detect abnormal traffic at the target server and update packet filters
located in the ISP routers or even in core routers; another solution may detect DDoS traffic at the edges of an ISP network and
filter packets in place while traffic statistics are aggregated from all edge routers by redundant controllers.
All DDoS mitigation techniques require, regardless of their design, a detection stage to notify the other components involved
when an attack is in progress thus effective and reliable detection is crucial for any mitigation technique to work.
DDoS Detection is not a trivial task because the network infrastructure transporting the packets cannot easily distinguish between
legitimate and malicious traffic. Target-end DDoS traffic detection techniques can be classified in three categories:
• Traffic self-similarity based detection
Self-similarity based detection of DDoS traffic are built on the assumption that unperturbed internet traffic exhibits self-similar
characteristics and long range dependence (LRD) [ERVW02]. A few techniques have been proposed for offline or realtime
[XLLH04] estimation of traffic self-similarity (and lack thereof).
• Traffic profile deviation from baseline
The assumption that internet traffic possess LRD properties [ERVW02] allows to describe statistical characteristics of traffic
that remain constant or change slowly in time. A collection of statistical characteristics of traffic during normal operations (i.e.
in absence of DDoS traffic) constitutes a baseline profiles. Subsequent monitoring of the packet flow can be used to compare
realtime traffic profile to the previously recorded baseline to detect deviation.
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• Source address based traffic volume accounting
Proposals exist for special data-structures [GP01] to hold source address based packet accounting information in a space
efficient manner, designed to avoid being exploited to mount a DoS attack. The information is then used to filter traffic coming
from source address ranges deemed suspicious.
We focus our interest on self-similarity based detection of DDoS because it possesses the useful property of not requiring invasive
traffic analysis for its estimation. For instance: recording the time-series of traffic intensity (sampled at a given frequency) is
enough to estimate self-similarity. This is a notable advantage compared to analysis techniques that require accessing a packets’
header or content. Self-similarity based detection also has the potential of detecting new DDoS traffic without requiring training
on an attack’s specific traffic flow.
Because of its flooding nature, DDoS increases the number of packets to be analysed. Therefore self-similarity estimation, with
its lower per-packet data collection cost, is an attractive tool. The low statistics collection overhead of self-similarity estimation
could enable embedding DDoS detection solutions in high speed network infrastructure equipment where computation resources
are committed almost entirely to routing.
1.2 Self-similarity
What is self-similarity and how does it affect network traffic modelling?
Self-similarity is a term introduced by B. Mandelbrot:
statistically "selfsimilar," meaning that each portion can be considered a reduced-scale image of the whole
—from the abstract of B. Mandelbrot’s 1967 paper ‘How Long Is the Coast of Britain? . . . ’ [Man67]
In other words self-similarity refers to a scale invariance property. A classic example of self-similarity is the silhouette of a
coastline, as seen from above, at increasing distance: as we move further away, the coast line will look like containing many
smaller versions of the initial silhouette. An interesting consequence of self-similarity is: if, still in the context of the above
example, we were to shuffle the set of coastline silhouette pictures taken at different distances, it would be very hard to re-order
them from the closest one to farthest one; informally proving that the silhouette looks very similar at different scales or in other
words it is qualitatively scale invariant.
Formally, if a curve F(x) is scale invariant under the transformation x1 = bx,y1 = ay, we have:
F(bx) = aF(x) = bHF(x) (1.1)
where the exponent H = log(a)/log(b) is called the Hurst exponent (also known as Hurst parameter or simply H). When 0.5<
H < 1 the curve displays long range correlation.
When applied to network traffic, self-similarity intuitively means that observing plots of traffic intensity at different time-scales
(say 10, 100, 1000 seconds), they will look very similar to the naked eye, thanks to its scale invariance property (see [LTWW94]
page 4).
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The scale invariance property of self-similar time-series can be visualized using a log-log plot. A log-log plot is a plot with
logarithmic scale on both axis. The log-log plot of a scale invariant curve F(x) is a straight line and the slope of the line depends
on the H exponent (see Figure 1.5). This property of scale invariant curves is used by a number of self similarity estimators to
approximate the value of H from a log-log plot (see [TTW95]).
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Figure 1.5: Log-log plot of a scale invariant (a) and a non scale invariant (b) curve.
Knowledge of the self-similar nature of network traffic helps building models and simulations with a higher confidence of closely
reproducing phenomena such as: queueing delay, packet loss and congestion that occur in real networks.
A very interesting property of scale invariance is that it buys parsimony when describing a process like packet arrival or traffic
intensity in time. Instead of having to devise complex models for bursty-ness, that would require several parameters, we can
effectively capture most statistically significant aspects of network traffic with three parameters (see [ERVW02] page 801, second
column): intensity mean, intensity variance and a self-similarity index.
1.2.1 Self-similarity of Network traffic
In the past network packet arrival times were modelled as Poisson processes mainly because of their relative analytic simplicity.
About a decade ago, papers regarding the non-Poisson nature of LAN packet inter-arrival times [LTWW94] started to appear,
similar conclusion regarding wide area network traffic followed closely [PPFF95].
These studies suggested network traffic displays a fractal-like behaviour called self-similarity. In the following years the network
engineering community became very interested and active in measuring self-similarity and understanding the reason behind
fractal-like behaviour in network traffic [CB97, BUBS97, ERVW02, WTSW97, KS02a, FGW98].
Self-similar packet inter-arrival time was initially considered bad news by the network research community. The immediate
consequences of fractal-like behaviour are longer average queueing delays and extended congestion times [SCVK02]. Also, at
the time, the reasons behind the emergence of self-similarity in network traffic was not clear and most of the initial research was
focussed on measuring its impact rather then understanding its origin.
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Research attempting to explain the origin of fractal-like behaviour in network traffic provides at least three different plausible
causes, each justifying the observed scale invariance for a different range of orders of magnitude. One related to the network
infrastructure and protocols, the other related to the nature of the information transferred and the third related to user and
application behaviour.
At the lower level, the interaction between transport protocol (TCP) and the network infrastructure (queueing delays, packet loss)
can explain pseudo self-similarity across small time-scales close to the average RTT of the network (see [ERVW02]). Pseudo
self-similarity is the term sometimes used to describe the fractal-like property of network traffic, because it only holds only for
few orders of magnitude of the scale.
In [CB97] Crovella et al. discuss file sizes distribution and user (or application) behaviour as causes of self-similarity in world
wide web traffic. The statistical distribution of file sizes (document, video, application size on the WWW) is heavy tailed like
the statistical distribution of the number of pages of books on a library’s shelves (see [Man82]). Informally heavy tailed file sizes
distribution means that there is high variability in the sizes and a lot more small files then big files. The concurrent transfer of
files with sizes drawn from an heavy tailed distribution explains the emergence of self-similar traffic. Traffic generators based
on simultaneous transfers with sizes drawn from Pareto, or other heavy tailed distribution, have been shown (see [HKBN07])
to reproduce self-similarity and better represent real network traffic. This explanation is independent of the specific transport or
application, it applies to any protocol supporting bulk data-transfer (not only to HTTP which is the underlying protocol of the
world wide web).
User (or application) behaviour can also account for self-similarity. If user activity is modelled as a succession of downloading
and reading times and the reading time distribution is heavy tailed then fractal-like behaviour emerges. User behaviour does
not seem to be the dominant source of self-similarity and is dismissed (see conclusions in [CB97]) in favour of explaining
self-similarity purely by superimposition of concurrent file transfers with sizes drawn from an heavy tailed distribution.
Feldmann et al. propose, in [FGW98], a multi-fractal interpretation for network traffic self-similarity. Informally, the multi-
fractal interpretation accommodates all of the three causes of fractal-like behaviour in network traffic (network infrastructure,
resources sizes distribution, user behaviour); each dominating in a limited range of the time-scale. The network infrastructure
and protocol induced effects dominate up to 100 milliseconds then the behaviour induced by high variability in transfer sizes
dominates roughly from 100 milliseconds to 10 seconds; user behaviour induced effects dominate the time-scales beyond tens of
seconds.
1.2.2 Self-similarity estimators
Self-similarity estimators are approximate methods used to measure the fractal-like property of a time-series. Network traffic can
be treated as a time-series by extracting some basic but salient features, namely: the aggregated size (data throughput per time
period) over several sequential periods and the packet inter-arrival time. Both aggregated size time-series and packet inter-arrival
time-series have been shown to possess self-similar properties (see respectively [PPFF95, CB97] and [BUBS97]).
Hurst et al. introduced the first self-similarity estimator called re-scaled range statistic (or simply: R/S) in [HBS65]. Hurst was
a hydrologist and his work on the R/S method was in relation with planning optimal size for water reservoirs given historical
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inflow data. The inflow data is an example of what we call a time-series, in this case the sequence of yearly water volume inflow
spanning tenths of years.
Many different estimators are currently available, most of which are described in sufficient details in Taqqu et al. empirical
study [TTW95]. Estimators like the original R/S method (see [TTW95] Section 3.6), introduced by Hurst himself, are essentially
graphical and rely on plotting an appropriately re-scaled time-series on a log-log scale and then apply linear regression to find
the slope of the fitting line. Others, like the periodogram method (see [TTW95] Section 3.7), are based on the estimation of
frequency density spectrum or alternatively on decomposition using the wavelet transform like [AAVV98]. Higuchi’s method
(see [TTW95] Section 3.4) computes the fractal dimension of a time-series to achieve the same goal.
Estimators differ in the methodology used to obtain the measure of self-similarity as well as many other areas: computational
cost, memory space cost, convergence speed, sensitivity, bias.
1.2.3 Self-similarity and DDoS detection
DDoS detection techniques based on self-similarity estimation rely on the assumption that malicious traffic alters the scale
invariant property of legitimate traffic. In Section 1.2.1 we have referenced existing literature supporting the widely accepted
notion that network traffic on both LANs and wide area IP networks (the internet) displays self-similar features. Intuitively it
seems reasonable that a large number of DDoS agents emitting an intense and continuous flow of packets will bury the natural
bursty-ness of the legitimate traffic.
Allen’s work on DDoS detection (see [AM04]) confirms that superimposition of self-similar and high intensity non self-similar
traffic results in traffic with a significant degradation of the original self-similarity.
A similar but more sophisticated result is achieved by Xiang et al. in [XLLH04]; their approach to DDoS detection is based on
a simplified R/S estimator implementation and on the observation the variance of the estimated value for H in time. In their tests
they observe a change in the value of H in correspondence of DDoS traffic in accordance with Allen’s work.
Li et al. in [Li06] shows how abnormal traffic flow affects averaged H estimates. Their conclusion is that the Hurst parameter
estimate always decreases in presence of abnormal traffic.
All the above three studies suggest that (non self-similar) DDoS traffic disrupts the self-similarity of normal traffic and that
variations in the estimate of the H parameter are a good indicator for the presence of an attack.
1.2.4 Self-similar DDoS traffic
DDoS detection techniques described in Section 1.2.3 are based on the observation that the presence of a DDoS attack degrades
the self-similarity of normal traffic flow. These observation are based on the assumption that DDoS tools do not generate self-
similar traffic. We believe this assumption may not hold for long given the current state of the art of DDoS generation tools and
their improvement trends.
We know from Taqqu et al. (see [TWS97]) that superimposition of multiple on-off packet trains with Pareto distributed periods
results in self-similar traffic. The value of the Hurst parameter for the generated traffic depends on the shape parameter of the
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Pareto distribution. We can therefore control the value of the H parameter for the generated traffic by choosing appropriate values
for the on-off period distribution.
Shaft, the DDoS tool we discussed in Section 1.1.1, is capable of controlling both start and duration of packet bursts for each of
its agents. Controlling burst and duration is sufficient to create an on-off packet train like the one used by the self-similar traffic
generator described by Taqque ae al. A clever attacker could instruct its agents to emit packets with Pareto distributed durations,
effectively generating self-similar DDoS traffic.
Even though we possess no evidence that Shaft has been used in this mode, we believe it is possible to do so. Assuming we
are correct in expecting tools like Shaft to be able to generate self-similar traffic, then detection of DDoS via self-similarity
estimation cannot rely on the malicious traffic flow to lack self-similarity.
1.3 Research project outline
We begin by defining DDoS and discussing its nature and implications for network security. The design and features of DDoS
bot-nets are also explained. Potential mitigation techniques are outlined and our choice of focussing on techniques that address
the target-end part of the network is justified by highlighting the economic advantages and technical restrictions at play.
The concept of self-similarity and its relation to network traffic is introduced in Chapter 1 followed by a discussion on self-
similarity estimation which is further expanded at a later stage when addressing estimators’ implementation.
We then proceed to define the network model used by our simulations to help framing the rest of our research and outline
requirements on software modules. In chapter Chapter 2 we discuss the abstraction and simplification steps involved in defining
a minimal model that is still useful for reproducing the DDoS conditions we are interested in.
Chapter 3 describes the design of the simulation framework used in the rest of the research. The framework is modular and
features an improvement over pure event based simulation engines to take advantage of the specific characteristics of our network
model.
In Chapter 4 we look for acceptable implementations of self-similarity estimators discussed in the literature. Our requirements
mandate that an acceptable implementation should be modular and should allow to be easily integrated with the other software
modules we use. Testing proves that readily available estimator libraries are not usable with large network traffic datasets. We
re-implement the estimators with large datasets in mind and run thorough tests, comparing results from third party estimators and
our implementations to make sure they are correct. We also develop a simple ad hoc distributed computation library and utilities
to run the estimators on our collection of traffic traces.
An observation on the implementation of the periodogram estimator method prompted an investigation on a interesting modi-
fication to its algorithm which are discussed in Section 4.5.3. The resulting modified periodogram estimator is not used in the
following stages of this research because the wavelet estimator, with its multi resolution analysis features, fits better with our
requirements.
In Chapter 5 we evaluate two separate instances of the traffic generator described in [TTW95] and reviewed in [HKBN07].
An existing third party implementation and our own are tested using wavelet multi resolution analysis (MRA, see Section 4.7).
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The tests results indicate that the quality of generated traffic quickly degrades when moving away from a set of ideal operating
parameters. We deem the quality of the generator not sufficient for our simulations and decide to use fractal Gaussian noise (fGn,
see [Pax97]) to synthesize traffic trace. The quality of both the fGn source and the shaping process are tested using MRA and we
conclude is that our shaping process does not affected the self-similar properties of the fGn time-series.
Using fGn traffic sources and the wavelet self-similarity estimator we test our model to verify that our design decisions are correct
(see Chapter 6 for details). We test single source behaviour with and without congestion for different values of the H parameter.
We also test the behaviour of the model with two identically setup sources in absence of congestion.
Finally, simulations are run with both sources set to generate traffic for different values of H parameter at different average
intensity levels. Chapter 7 contains the description of the simulations scenarios and a discussion of the results.
We observe how the self-similarity of the resulting traffic changes depending on the ratio of the two sources’ traffic intensity and
the distance of the two sources’ value of H. We conclude that, even when DDoS traffic is self-similar, detection is still possible.
We also find that the traffic flow resulting from the superimposition of DDoS flow and legitimate traffic flow possesses a level of
self-similarity that depends non-linearly on both relative traffic intensity and on the difference in self-similarity between the two
incoming flows.
1.4 Summary
Distributed denial of service indicates an abnormal network condition brought about by a large number of hosts acting in concert
and that results in a degradation of one or more targeted services offered over the network.
The self-similar nature of attack free network traffic is supported by many studies (see [ERVW02, WTSW97, CB97, BUBS97,
PPFF95, LTWW94]) and its degradation in presence of DDoS has been studied before (see [AM04, XLLH04, Li06, Li04]).
Degradation of self-similarity can be used as a basis for DDoS detection. DDoS detection is an important part of any mitigation
technique and it is worth studying and improving. DDoS detection via self-similarity is, so far, based on the assumption that the
malicious traffic flow does not posses self-similar properties.
Given the trend of quick evolutionary improvements of DDoS generation tools, we believe it is likely DDoS tools could be used
to emit self-similar traffic contrary to the underlaying assumption of current DDoS detection techniques based on self-similarity
estimation. Our review of the analysis of the Shaft DDoS generation tool (see [DLD00]) suggests that it could be used to generate
self-similar traffic in a fashion similar to one described in [TWS97] thus supporting our thesis regarding self-similar DDoS traffic.
We intend to investigate the result of superimposing self-similar legitimate and malicious traffic flows and deduce under which
conditions detection of DDoS is possible.
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Part II
Implementation
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Chapter 2
Network Model
In the following sections we discuss three network models suitable for simulating the DDoS traffic conditions relevant to this
thesis. The intermediate steps and results of the discussion will be presented visually with block diagrams in which the model’s
components are the building blocks (hosts, routers, links) and the diagrams represent the overall model.
Modelling of the network involves both conceptual and practical simplifications of reality, we attempt to strike the right balance
between a simple implementable model and a complete one by including components that, according to existing literature,
account for the effects which are the subject of this research project.
We begin by introducing the set of network characteristics the model should preserve, then we proceed to justify our choices and
later we introduce the first version of the model.
We will start from a very simple model, we will then extend it incrementally with additional components to account for the
phenomena we need to reproduce and to enable us defining new simulation scenarios.
2.1 Requirements
For the model to be useful it is required to reproduce effects influencing self-similarity of network traffic. In this section we list
known network properties and for each one, we justify inclusion or exclusion from the model.
A. Observable network traffic behaviour that our network model should preserve are:
1. Self-similar packet inter-arrival time-series and self-similar aggregated sizes time-series
Network traffic characteristics as self-similar packet inter-arrival and aggregate sizes time-series are the focus of the
interest of this research project and clearly need to be part of the model.
2. Packet loss due to congestion and consequent loss of self-similarity
In presence of a DDoS attack, which implies increased traffic intensity, the network infrastructure is more likely
to discard packets. Discarding traffic in turn affects the packet arrival distribution at the target and may affect the
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degree of the traffic self-similarity. A detector based on estimation of traffic self-similarity would thus be affected by
congestion. Packet loss due to congestion is therefore relevant to our research.
3. Bandwidth limits
Bandwidth limits on transmission links affect traffic self-similarity in a negative way. When traffic intensity bursts
or exceeds in a sustained manner the available bandwidth, packets are queued in the routing nodes experiencing
congestion. Queued packets are delayed and in case of prolonged congestion they are discarded.
As a side-effect of congestion, packets exit the routing node at approximately maximum link speed which in turn
results in a loss of self-similarity (see [AM04]). While we want to take into account this effect in our model, we
would also like to limit the number of entities modelled. We therefore factor the distributed nature of bandwidth
limits into one single rate limiting queue component (see Section 2.4.1) that will approximate loss of self-similarity
due to congestion.
B. Observable network traffic behaviour we choose to not model:
1. Packet transmission delay
Packet transmission delay is the result of transmission bandwidth and link length. Packets travelling from source
to destination will generally traverse many different links each one with potentially different operating parameters
(bandwidth, distance). Also, packets from different sources will also generally take different paths inside the network
to reach the same target.
Under the assumption that the network is stable from the routing point of view (that is: all packets from a source A to
a destination B always travel along the same path) the transmission delay is a constant value ‘dAB’ for a given (source
node, destination node) tuple.
Formally, under the assumption of network routing stability, the following holds: Tdelay(A,B) = dAB for any pair A,
B of source and destination nodes. In our study of DDoS detection, the target of the attack B is determined and thus
the previous equation depends only on the source A.
Exploiting the fact that given a source and destination pair (A, B), the delay ‘dAB’ is constant, we can imagine shifting
the packet source generation time-series by ‘dAB’ for each packet source A to account for the delay and assume the
transmission of packets is instant. Packet arrival time-series as observed by the target node is unaffected by our
simplification.
A further potential simplification is possible if we assume that a constant finite shift of packet emission time-series
at the source will not affect the self-similarity of the inter-arrival distribution and of the aggregate traffic. This
assumption is valid because by definition the self-similarity of a time-series is a scale invariant property; in other
words, it is not affected by affine transformations thus a constant and finite shift of packet emission time-series does
not change self-similarity. This last simplification allows us to disregard transmission delays completely in our model.
The advantage of this approach is a reduction of entities to be modelled, in this case: transmission links.
2. Packet processing delays
Packet processing delays are also not modelled, similarly to packet transmission delay they are the result of packets
traversing the network infrastructure. Processing delay is due to the multiple routing nodes (instead of transmission
links, like in the case of transmission delay) traversed by a packet on its way to the destination.
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Total packet processing delay for a packet p can be formally defined as: Pdelay(A,B, p)=∑n∈N(A,B) [T1(p,n)−T0(p,n)]
where N is the set of routing nodes traversed by packet p from the source node A to the destination node B and
T1(p,n)−T0(p,n) is the time a given packet p spends inside a node n before being transmitted.
Packet processing time depends on mainly two factors: the local traffic conditions at each of the routing nodes, which
affect the queue length, and the packet forwarding time. Also the queuing discipline implemented by each node
could affect packet processing delay, but in this discussion we assume all routing nodes have a strict LILO queuing
discipline.
As a result, the cumulative packet processing delay of all nodes traversed is highly variable and has been shown
to explain some degree of traffic self-similarity (see [BUBS97]). While in a real network both the packet source’s
emission distribution and the processing delays have been shown to explain traffic self-similarity, the presence of
only one is sufficient for traffic self-similarity to emerge.
We therefore decide to rely only on the packet sources to account for self-similarity and reduce the number of entities
in our model by effectively ignoring packet processing delays.
2.2 Initial Model
This is the first and and also the simplest of the three models introduced in this chapter. The other models extend it incrementally
to satisfy all requirements listed in Section 2.1. After introducing two components used in the model’s diagrams we describe the
simplification steps used to reduce a large scale network into our simple model.
2.2.1 Detector component
For the purpose of this thesis we define a detector as a functional block that observes a sequence of network packets flowing in a
given direction and provides as output a tuple (flag, confidence), whose elements are respectively: a boolean value indicating if
detection of DDoS occurred and a real valued confidence level in the range [0,1].
Traffic Detector
Parameters
(True/False,Confidence)
Figure 2.1: Component block for a generic detector including its inputs and outputs.
In general a detector may expose some configuration parameters, may require a realtime clock reference and may have an internal
state. To account for all of the above we formally define a detector as any function d of the form d(t¯, p¯, s¯0,c) = (r, l, s¯1) where t¯
is a contiguous subset of the network traffic time-series, p¯ is a vector of operating parameters dependent on the function d, c is
the current time-stamp, r is a boolean value and l is the confidence level. The vectors s¯0 and s¯1 are respectively the previous and
updated state of the detector. The cardinality of t¯ is called the ‘detector window size’.
The equivalent block diagram component used from here on to describe a detector can be found in Figure 2.1.
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2.2.2 Test point component
We also introduce a ‘test point’ block diagram component (see Figure 2.2) to allow connecting detectors (see Section 2.2.1) and
other traffic analysers (see the next paragraph) to the network.
Traffic T
Traffic
Traffic
Figure 2.2: Test point component for block diagrams. Forwards a copy of all incoming traffic to its outgoing edges.
The abstract component behaviour is to forward a copy of all incoming traffic to both its outputs. Test points are useful to
indicate where traffic is sampled in a network model diagram. Test points can be used to connect detector(s) or estimators for
other network parameters to the network topology.
Estimators like a Hurst parameter estimator or a traffic intensity estimator are components that do not modify the traffic flow in
either content or timing, their presence as no effect on the traffic observed by the target. In general estimator components provide
a mean to perform computations based on traffic flowing at a particular point in the network model.
2.2.3 Simple model
We proceed to describe the simplest model that still accounts for the phenomena listed in Section 2.1 list A. Given an arbitrary
graph representing a network (for instance Figure 2.3a), we partition the original graph in two sub-graphs: one containing all
potential DDoS traffic source nodes and the other containing the DDoS traffic target nodes (see Figure 2.3b). Such partitioning
is always possible and in practical cases the two partitions will be connected by a small number of edges. In this research project
we limit our considerations to partitions connected by only one edge, but the resulting model is applicable to the many-edges
case.
Next, imagine collapsing all source nodes into a single ‘traffic source’ component and all target nodes in a single ‘target’ com-
ponent. The result (see Figure 2.3c or Figure 2.4 ) is the first version of our network model.
The traffic sources component and target sub-network component in Figure 2.4 represent the entire network topology as a compact
model. The notion that a sigle emitter can substitute an entire source graph is a very convenient simplification which is not valid
in general when dealing with network simulations. However, it is acceptable when operating under the following conditions: (1)
traffic is assumed to be uni-directed from sources to destination, (2) only packet arrival times and sizes are relevant in the analysis
of traffic and the traffic source is either (2a) replaying previously captured traffic traces, or (2b) a special traffic generator that
reproduces the sizes and arrival time distributions of a cloud of sources.
Traffic Source Target Sub-net
Figure 2.4: Simple network model. All traffic between the traffic source and the target flows across single edge.
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(a)
Traffic sources Target Sub-net
(b)
Traffic Source Target Sub-net
(c)
Figure 2.3: Simplification steps to obtain the model described in Section 2.2.3. Step 1: Initial sample network topology (a). Step
2: Hosts are clustered as either traffic sources or destinations (b). Step 3: Cluster are collapsed into opaque blocks (c).
Even a very simple model like the one in Figure 2.4 can be useful to verify the correctness of assumptions on the nature of a traffic
source; it can also be used to test the implementation of the component involved without adding further complexity. Testing of
estimators and traffic generators will be the primary use of this model during this research project.
2.2.4 Example use case
Figure 2.5 displays an use case for the model we just introduced. To obtain the block diagram in Figure 2.5 from Figure 2.4 we
place a ‘test-point’ on the edge between the source and target blocks, then attach an ‘Hurst parameter estimator’ to the free edge
of the test-point.
Traffic Source T Target Sub-net
H Estimator
Figure 2.5: Example use case for the simple model: test the source’s H parameter setting or the estimator’s correctness.
This setup can be used to verify a traffic generator’s output or evaluate an estimator for the Hurst parameter.
2.3 Extended Model
The model described in the previous section does not make any assumptions on the nature of the incoming traffic. While it
represents a real world scenario for a detector, it does not model either the separation between legitimate traffic sources and
attack traffic sources or the notion that traffic observed at the target host is the result of the superimposition of legitimate and
malicious traffic.
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Traffic arriving at the target in Figure 2.4 originates from many hosts distributed geographically; while it is not possible to
establish which nodes originate legitimate traffic and which nodes originate malicious traffic both types of traffic reach the target
after being routed via the network infrastructure.
We wish to extend the previous model to include the concept of legitimate and malicious traffic superimposition we just intro-
duced; in order to do so we proceed as follows:
Step 1 We introduce a new functional block (see Figure 2.6) called ‘traffic mixer’ from here on. The traffic mixer outputs a
superimposition of the traffic entering its incoming edges. The traffic mixer output conserves the chronological order of incoming
packets and assume all its incoming and outgoing edges have infinite capacity so that no delay or queueing occur.
Step 2We group all traffic sources conceptually in one of the two categories: malicious and legitimate. We also, for the sake of
this model, aggregate the entire routing infrastructure in a single ‘traffic mixer’.
+
Figure 2.6: Traffic mixer component for block diagrams. Mixes traffic from two sources into one single flow.
Applying the above steps to our first iteration of the model we obtain a second one (see Figure 2.7) which overcomes the
limitations mentioned at the beginning of this section by splitting the traffic source into two distinct sources each corresponding
to a traffic category: a legitimate traffic source and a malicious traffic source. The traffic generated by the two sources is then
‘mixed’ and forwarded towards the target host by the ‘traffic mixer’ component.
LT Source
+
AT Source
Target Sub-net
Figure 2.7: Extended network model. Legitimate traffic (LT) and Attack traffic (AT) sources are separated.
2.3.1 Example use case
Our extended model allows us to test the relationship between the Hurst parameter value estimated at the test point (see Figure 2.8)
and the Hurst parameter of each of the sources traffic sources.
LT Source
+
AT Source
T
H Estimator
Target Sub-net
Figure 2.8: Example use case for the extended model: test relationship between H of the sources and H as observed by the target.
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2.4 Final Model
The resulting model from the previous section does not account for packet loss due to congestion as required by Section 2.1 list
A item 2. We add another class of components to our model to satisfy our original requirement. The component class will be
called ‘rate limiting queue’ and one instance will be placed after the traffic mixer component on the model from the previous
section. The resulting diagram can be found in Figure 2.10.
2.4.1 Rate limiting queue
The rate limiting queue is internally composed by a finite queue attached to a rate limiter (see Figure 2.9). The rate limiter allows
packets to exit the queue at a specific rate while the queue has a maximum finite length and a packet discarding policy. The
resulting component can be used to model packet loss and changes to traffic self-similarity due to congestion.
Rate limiting queue
Traffic
Queue
 
 
 
 
 
Rate limiter Traffic
Figure 2.9: Rate limiting queue internals.
LT Source
+
AT Source
Rate Limiting queue Target sub-net
Figure 2.10: Network model complete with rate limiting queue components.
2.4.2 Example use case
The final model use case instance in Figure 2.11 is designed to test the expected loss of self-similarity in case of congestion (see
Section 2.1 list A item 2).
LT Source
+
AT Source
T
H Estimator
Target Sub-netRate Limiting queue
Figure 2.11: Example use case for the final model: test loss of self-similarity under network congestion.
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2.5 Summary
Defining a simulation model helps framing the research problem and is the first step towards setting up our network simulations.
Self-similarity estimation based DDoS detection requires the network model to reproduce specific real network phenomena like:
conserving self-similarity of the sources and packet loss due to congestion. We listed and explained the requirements for the
model then proceeded to introduce the model.
A first, simple model, is outlined and then to extended it in two steps: the first to separate legitimate and attack traffic generation
and the second to account for packet loss due to congestion. Use cases are listed to illustrate potential usage for each of the three
resulting models and justifications for for each incremental step are given.
The model highlights the abstract building blocks we require to proceed with our simulations. The final model features an one-
way tree-like network topology and the most significant building blocks are: two independently controllable self-similar traffic
sources and a self-similarity estimator. The design and implementation of these two components and the framework that provides
the infrastructure to support their functionality are the subject of the next chapters.
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Chapter 3
Simulation framework
Simulation is a common part of network related research and a number of simulation tools developed to aid researchers are
available. Network simulation tools are usually based on the event based simulation paradigm which is very generic and thus
supports a wide class of simulation problems. However, event based simulation, being generic, does not take advantage of the
specific features of the model under scrutiny.
In the following sections we will introduce event based simulation design concepts and propose modifications targeted to our
network model and aimed at improving performance. The design that results from our modifications differs, from pure event
based simulation engines, in that we distinguish two classes of simulated entities: events and traffic quanta instead of simulating
exclusively events. Traffic quanta are processed in bulk, instead of singularly like in pure event simulation engines, resulting in
shorter processing times.
3.1 Event based simulation
Computer simulations are usually run on frameworks that support a simulation paradigm called event based. In event based sim-
ulation systems everything happening at run time is modeled as an event. Events represent packet arrivals, simulation parameter
changes, timed events and anything else that has a side-effect on the model. A side-effect is any modification to the state of the
model including scheduling other events. Examples of side-effects are: changing a component’s parameter like a packet source’s
rate, adding or removing a traffic source.
The basic infrastructure of an event based simulation engine is composed by an event queue data-structure and by an event
dispatcher. The main execution loop of such system will retrieve the next event from the queue, set the simulation clock to the
time of the event and dispatch the event to its handler. When the call to the event handler returns it is assumed all side-effects
of the event are complete including the scheduling of new events; then the loop restarts form the beginning. The simulation
continues until an event handler explicitly terminates the main loop or there are no more events in the queue.
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Pop next event
 from the queue
Start sim
Set sim clock to
 event’s timestamp
Invoke the event’s
 handler
End sim
Figure 3.1: Event based simulator main loop.
Event based simulation is an elegant design because it is simple and effective in supporting a very large class of simulations. In
practice event based simulation will work for any problem where the causality principle holds. That is, when any given event
occurring at time T0 can only effect the outcome of events occurring at a time T1 with T1 > T0.
Event based simulation has the disadvantage of being computationally expensive. The assumption that every side-effect is
modeled as an event results in simulation engine having to process separately a very large number of elementary operations. For
instance, running a simple network model with a 100Mbit/s traffic source, a router and a sink connected by two links results
in approximately 10 millions packet/events per second at the source, but since the packets are also received by the other four
components of the network (two links, a router and a sink), the total number of events is five times the number of packets
generated by the source: 50 millions per second. In general the number of events processed grows as a function of the number of
components added to the model.
The large number of events involved causes the high computational cost of event based simulations because each event, even if
elementary, needs to be handled separately and this adds a significant overhead. To explain how this happens we need to look
at the main simulation loop described previously. In the simulation engine’s main loop each event corresponds to a function
call. Each call will result in the CPU storing the state of some registers upon call and restoring them upon return. The function
called to process the event will have its own internal setup overhead due to sanity checks, configuration value lookups and any
other operation required to prepare for processing the event. The function will then process the event applying side-effects to the
model and return. So, for instance, a sequence of one hundred packets emitted by the same source and addressed to the same
destination are represented by contiguous events on the queue; they will be processed one at a time: with one hundred calls to
the same event handler function.
The obvious optimization consists in grouping the packets and invoking an handler capable of processing a sequence of events.
Unfortunately this solution is not applicable except in some specific cases because it breaks the event based simulation model. In
event based simulation each event’s side-effect(s) must be complete before the next event is allowed to affect the model. Breaking
this rule results in unreliable simulations because the side-effects of events being processed in one group are not visible to other
events within the same block.
Taking advantage of the specific features of the network models used in this research, namely: tree structured network topologies
and unidirectional traffic flow; we intend to design a simulation framework that can process traffic more efficiently without
resulting in unreliable simulations.
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3.2 Framework Design Goals
Our simulation framework aims at being used for the evaluation of DDoS scenarios beyond this research project for networks
models under the constraints of Chapter 2. To be usable outside this research the simulation framework has to be modular and
extensible. Extensible because it should be possible to add new components or different implementations of existing components,
if required. Modular because it should be possible to extend the framework without modifying the existing components.
The simulation framework should provide the basic components required by our simulations and an infrastructure to connect
them in a an useful fashion. It should also provide some means of controlling and monitoring the progress of a simulation and
collecting the results.
3.3 Model Topology
Taking advantage of the specific characteristics of the problem we are addressing it is possible to simplify the design of the
framework simulation.
First we introduce some terminology definitions:
• model is the abstract representation of the simulated system. In our case it is the network model described in Chapter 2.
• topology refers to the way entities that are part of the model are connected.
• component is any node or edge in a model’s topology.
The topologies of the network models described in Chapter 2 can be always reduced to a tree structure, we thus define the entity
component as a n-tree node (see Figure 3.2). This means that each component in the topology will have n incoming edges (traffic
sources) and exactly one outgoing edge.
Component sources 1..*destination 1..1
Link Source Sink Queue
Figure 3.2: Component entity-relation hierarchy diagram.
Every block in a topology diagram is a specialization of the component entity. Link, Traffic source, Traffic sink, Queue are all
examples of specialized component entities that represent blocks in a topology (see Figure 3.2).
LT Source
+
AT Source
T
H Estimator
Target Sub-net
(a) Network model topology
Source 1 Link
Source 2 Link
H Estimator Link Sink
(b) Simulation engine topology
Figure 3.3: Example: Transformation from network model topology to internal simulation engine topology.
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As an example application we now show how to represent a network model taken from Chapter 2 into an n-tree structure using
blocks derived from the component entity. Starting from a block diagram representing a simple network (see Figure 3.3a) we
replace all nodes and edges with their corresponding components. The transformation between the two is straightforward except
for the placement of the Hurst parameter estimator H. The estimator is attached on its own branch in (see Figure 3.3a) while it is
attached in line with the other components in (see Figure 3.3b). The estimator is moved in line with other components to achieve
the required n-tree structure layout and the test point block is removed form the topology. Moving blocks from a test point branch
to an in line layout is always possible thanks to the fact that all analyzer components are required by design to never alter the
traffic flow, effectively making them act like a null passthrough.
Another noteworthy feature of the transformation is the absence of the traffic mixer block from the resulting tree topology. The
traffic mixer block is omitted because its functionality is implicit in the definition of the component entity. Any component with
multiple sources will automatically merge incoming traffic.
Applying the procedure described above, our restricted network models can be transformed into n-tree component structures.
These n-tree structures (or component trees) have the property of reproducing the traffic flow from sources to destination when
walked from leaves to root. Because of this property, component trees can be used as internal representation of a network model
in a simulation engine.
3.4 Simulation Engine Implementation
The simulation framework takes advantage of the specific nature of the network model we are using for our simulations. In the
model defined in Chapter 2, traffic flows unidirectionally from sources to destination and the topologies are trees with traffic
generators as leafs and the target as root. This is not true in general for network simulations.
Unidirectionality of traffic flow and the tree topology properties of the model allow us to design a simulation engine that is more
efficient than a strict event based simulation engine. Before we can introduce the optimizations we need to define the basic
features of the framework’s design. The main entities involved in our design are: components, events and packets:
• Components are the building blocks of the simulated model and equivalent to blocks in block diagrams. Components provide
the functionalities required by the model, like traffic generators, queues, links.
• Events in this context has the same meaning as in the conventional event based simulation (see Section 3.1) except packets (or
cells or frames) are not considered events but they are treated as a separate entity.
• Packets are in this context a conventional name for any indivisible unit of traffic. Depending on the type of network modeled
by a specific simulation instance the word packet could mean an ethernet frame, an ATM cell, an IP datagram or others.
Our design of the simulation engine is based on the observation that the number of packets processed during a network simulation
is larger by many orders of magnitude than the number of parameter-changing events. The distinction between events and packets
entities in the list above is a result of this observation.
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In a conventional event based simulation engine both packet arrivals and events are processed one at a time. In our design
components process packets in blocks thus reducing the overhead by a factor that is in the order of magnitude of the logarithm
of the block size. Events are still processed one at a time like in conventional event based simulation engines.
Some restrictions on event scheduling must be imposed to avoid unreliable simulation results. The restrictions are as follows:
1. Events can always be scheduled before the beginning of the simulation
2. Events can always be scheduled during the execution of an event handler
3. Events cannot be scheduled by traffic processing components
If necessary the last restriction can be relaxed into: “traffic processing components can only schedule events with a time-stamp
greater then or equal to the one of the first event in the queue” without loss of reliability.
Without the above restrictions a traffic processing component could potentially schedule an event with a time-stamp smaller than
an already circulating packet. The scenario for this situation is as follows: the topology in figure Figure 3.4 is used. Source 1
emits traffic up to Te, source 2 emits traffic up to T2 < Te, the sink component will process queued traffic up to T2. If the sink
was to schedule an event n to alter the rate of source 1 with a time-stamp T2 < Tn < Te then the event would not affect the traffic
already emitted by source 1 for the time slice [Tn, Te].
Source 1
Link
Source 2
Sink
Figure 3.4: Example component topology.
The size of the traffic blocks processed by a component in our optimized engine is determined by the distance between two
consecutive events. This is because under the restrictions listed above only events can have side-effects on the model. If during
the period between any two events, simulation parameters cannot be changed then every component behaves uniformly during
that period.
The main simulation loop in our optimized engine takes advantage of the restrictions on event scheduling by, at each iteration,
invoking processing of all traffic between the current value of the simulation clock and the next scheduled event. The next
scheduled event is called event horizon for the current processing block.
At each iteration all components in the topology are invoked passing the event horizon as a parameter. Each component will then
generate, queue, filter or process traffic for the time slice starting at the current simulation clock up until the event horizon.
For instance, consider the simulation timeline in Figure 3.5 and let the simulation clock be 0.1s. According to the time line the
simulation is in the middle of processing block B4 and the next scheduled event is E3. No other event can be scheduled at this
point, because only events can schedule other events, so processing will proceed undisturbed until the event horizon (E3) for the
current block is reached.
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0.0 0.1 0.2
E0 E1 E2 E4 E5
B1 B2
T0
B3 B4 B5
t
Figure 3.5: Example simulation timeline with events (En) indicated by vertical arrows and processing blocks (Bn) by grey boxes.
T0 is the simulation start time.
The order of invokation of the components is critical because components are connected in a topology and depending on their
connections they can play the role of traffic source, traffic destination or both. Sources need to be called before their respective
destinations to avoid breaking causality of packet propagation. In classic event based simulation topologies are graphs and thus
an unique invokation order cannot be established. However, our restricted set of network models are strictly n-tree structures for
which an order of invokation can always be found and is the reverse breath first order.
For instance, in Figure 3.3b the order of invokation for the components would be from left to right: Source1, Source2, Link,
Link, H estimator, Link, Sink. This is because the reversed breath first order respects the order in which traffic flows from one
component to the next.
Example 3.1 Pseudocode for the framework’s main loop
def mainloop():
#Prepare an ordered list of components to be invoked
breathFirstList = treeOperations.breathFirst(componentsTree)
reverseBreathFirstList = breathFirstNodeList.reverse()
#The simulation starts at time 0
clock.set(0)
#The main loop exits when the simulation is finished or
#when there are no more events to be processed
while simulation.isFinished() or eventQueue.isEmpty():
#The event horizon is the next event’s timestamp
eventHorizon = scheduler.nextEventTimestamp()
#Invoke components in reverse breath first order
for component in reverseBreathFirstList:
eventHorizon = component.process( eventHorizon )
#Update the simulation clock
clock.set(eventHorizon)
#Execute the event with timestamp == eventHorizon, if any
eventQueue.execute(eventHorizon)
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Because of the n-tree structure of the simulated topology, each component can be in one of three roles: source, sink and
passthrough. The three roles correspond respectively to: the leaves, the root and the trunk of the topology. For instance in
Figure 3.3b: links, Hurst parameter estimators, rate limiting queue are examples of trunk components; Sink is a root component;
traffic sources are leaves.
The implementation of a component is based on a different template determined by its role in the topology. The following
pseudocode snippets are simplified templates for components implementations in all of the three cases outlined above.
Example 3.2 Pseudocode template for source component
def nextPacketTimeStamp():
#implementation details determine the nature of the generator
pass
def nextPacket():
#implementation details determine the nature of the generator
pass
def process( eventHorizon ):
#Generate packets up until ’eventHorizon’
while self.nextPacketTimeStamp() < eventHorizon:
destinationQueue.push( self.nextPacket() )
return min( eventHorizon, self.nextPacketTimeStamp() )
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Example 3.3 Pseudocode template for passthrough component
def recordStats( packet ):
#Optionally record stats for ’packet’
pass
def modify( packet ):
#Optionally modify ’packet’
pass
def process( eventHorizon ):
#Dequeue packets, process them then enqueue them, up until ’eventHorizon’
while sourceQueue.nextPacketTimestamp() < eventHorizon:
packet = sourceQueue.popNextPacket()
#Optionally modify ’packet’ or record stats before queuing it
self.recordStats( packet )
self.modify( packet )
destinationQueue.push( packet )
return min( eventHorizon, packet.timeStamp() )
Example 3.4 Pseudocode template for sink component
def process( eventHorizon ):
#Dequeue packets up until ’eventHorizon’
while sourceQueue.nextPacketTimestamp() < eventHorizon:
packet = sourceQueue.popNextPacket()
#Optionally record stats before dequeueing the next packet
return min( eventHorizon, packet.timeStamp() )
3.5 Summary
Event based simulation is the most common design used by network simulation engines. The reason for its success is rooted in
its simplicity and the broad class of problems tractable with it. We propose a modification to pure event simulation engine design
to take advantage of the specific nature of our research problem.
Our modification hinges on distinguishing the event concept from pure event simulation into two distinguished classes: events
proper and traffic quanta. The advantage of this distinction coupled with the simple tree structure of the network topologies we
intend to simulate allows us to process traffic quanta in bulk instead of singularly.
We implemented the modification into our modular simulation framework which is used for the rest of the research.
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Chapter 4
Self-similarity estimators
There are many estimators for self-similarity covered by literature, most of them surveyed by Taqqu et al. in [TTW95]. Estimators
are algorithms that accept a time series as input and produce an estimate for the level of self-similarity as the output.
Most estimation algoritms are graphical in nature and were devised with small datasets (a few thousand observations) in mind.
As part of our project we need to evaluate their execution cost against large datasets (in the order of tens of million observations)
that are involved when analyzing network traffic.
Recorded network traces are a good candidate for testing estimators because they contain traffic captured on a real network.
The traces are processed into a time series representing an arrival process model and then used to benchmark the estimator’s
behaviour.
The following sections will introduce the relevant concepts and report on the benchmarking of third party estimators and on our
own implementation thereof.
4.1 Traffic traces
In these preliminary tests the estimators will be run against a series of traffic traces available for download from the MAWI
project website [MAW08]. MAWI is an acronym for the Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet and is part of the
WIDE Project: Widely Integrated Distributed Environment. MAWI traces were chosen because they are readily available for
download and they fit our requirement of high speed internet link traces.
Traces with daily traffic for the month of May 2007 recorded at MAWI samplepoint-F were downloaded. Each trace records all
traffic flowing on a 100Mbit/s trans-pacific link for 15 minutes a day. The length of the traces for the month of May totals around
11Gbytes. This is an example of MAWI trace metadata available from the MAWI project archive [MAW08]:
DumpFile: 200705011400.dump
FileSize: 1748.31MB
Id: 200705011400
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StartTime: Tue May 1 14:00:01 2007
EndTime: Tue May 1 14:15:00 2007
TotalTime: 899.17 seconds
TotalCapSize: 1367.78MB CapLen: 96 bytes
# of packets: 24937582 (16658.35MB)
AvgRate: 155.44Mbps stddev:11.07M
The traces are recorded using the pcap library format (pcap is short for packet-capture, see [pa08]). Pcap is a popular format and
is recognized by a wide number of software tools. We use the pycap Python wrapper [Row08] for the pcap library to process
traces in our software utilities.
MAWI traces contain packet arrival time-stamp, anonymized headers and no payload. While the payload is removed the informa-
tion contained in the header is sufficient to derive the size of the payload. Payload size together with packet arrival information
allows us to calculate the intensity of the traffic over time. Anonymized headers are not a limiting factor in the context of our
research because self-similarity estimation does not require source and destination addresses or protocol specific flag information.
4.2 Traffic process models
The sequence of packets contained in the traffic traces cannot be used directly as input for the estimation algorithm, it must be
pre-processed into a time-series first. There are various options for converting traffic traces into a time-series, each option is a
different “arrival process model” and highlights specific properties of the traffic flow. For a discussion of possible arrival process
models see [HKBN07]. In general the value of the self-similarity estimates depends on the process model applied to a trace. The
reason for this dependence is that each process model highlights different dynamic properties of the traffic flow and is further
discussed in [AAVV98].
0.0 0.1 0.2
(a) Packet arrival process. The position of vertical arrows indi-
cates arrival time and their length indicates packet size.
0 10 20
(b) Packet inter-arrival process. The height of histograms indi-
cates the time between two consecutive packet arrivals.
Figure 4.1: Inter-arrival process (b) derived from the packet arrival process (a). The height of the histograms in (b) corresponds
to the distance between two consecutive arrivals in (a). Note that the inter-arrival process is not plotted on a time axis but on an
incremental packet arrival axis.
The inter-arrival process is the sequence of time intervals between packet arrivals. This process model is useful to analyze the
distribution of arrival frequencies. If, for instance, five hypothetical packet arrival times in seconds were as follows: 0.3, 0.45,
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0.51, 0.523, 0.55; then the inter-arrival process time-series would be: 0.15, 0.06, 0.013, 0.027. As it can be seen in the previous
example: the inter-arrival process applied to an input trace of N packets will output a time-series of N-1 observations.
0.0 0.1 0.2
(a) Packet arrival process. The position of vertical arrows indi-
cates arrival time and their length indicates packet size.
0.0 0.1 0.2
(b) Packet aggregate sizes process. The height of histograms
indicates the total data transferred in an aggregation period (pe-
riod=0.4).
Figure 4.2: Aggregate size process (a) derived from the packet arrival process (b).
The aggregate sizes process is obtained by establishing an aggregation period length and counting the number of octects or bits
arrival in each period. An octect is a sequence of 8 bits and equivalent in length to a byte. The sequence of octects or bits count
for each period is the aggregate sizes process time-series. The aggregation period length h must be selected carefully. If h is too
small the process degenerates in a series of zeros and sparse positive counts, if h is too big the total number of aggregation periods
in a finite trace will decrease reducing the number of available observations and consequently the precision of the estimator.
The inter-arrival process model will be used to reduce the trace to a time-series for testing the estimators. Later in the project we
will use the aggregate-sizes process for our simulations.
4.3 Implementation
A simple program was implemented to apply the inter-arrival process model to the MAWI traces and convert them into a com-
pressed text file. File compression combined with the little information required to represent the inter-arrival process results in a
dramatic reduction in storage requirements.
The statistical software package R [fSC08] is used to run the first round of self-similarity estimator tests. A library called fSeries
is available for the statistical analysis package R and contains functions for self-similarity estimation. Its source code is freely
downloadable which makes it a good candidate for use in our project. The availability of source code allows us to assess the
details of the implementation and, if required, improve on the existing algorithms.
The estimators available in the fSeries library for R are: R/S, aggregate variance method, differenced variance method, absolute
values method, periodogram method, boxed periodogram method, Higuchi’s method, Whittle estimator. Our preliminary tests
consist of running all these estimators against the traffic traces and compare the resulting estimates.
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We found that none of the estimators in the fSeries library could cope with the size of our network traffic traces, when run on
computers available to us. The estimators ran out of memory and were ultimately terminated by the operating system even on
systems with 4GBytes of physical memory. Only 3 to 4 million observations out of the 12 million contained in a typical MAWI
15 minutes trace could be processed before a crash invariably occurred.
Access to the source code for R’s libraries proved useful to understand the nature of the problem. Auditing the source code it
appeared that R’s internal representation of floating point numbers coupled with frequent array copy operation and failure to
release allocated memory were the cause of the problem.
R uses only double precision floating point format (64bits or 4bytes) to represent numbers internally. A MAWI traffic trace
contains a number of packets that exceeds 20 millions; the number of observations in the inter-arrival time series is of the same
order of magnitude which results in approximately 80 Mbytes of memory storage for each copy of the dataset. R operates in
such a way that array operations, which are ubiquitous in the implementation of the estimation algorithms, result in allocation of
multiple copies of the input dataset. R’s internal memory management system does not promptly free memory allocated to the
arrays ultimately causing the process to be terminated before completion.
A first attempt at solving this issue entailed analysing each estimator’s implementation and removing redundant operations that
would adversely impact memory allocation. Although we were successful at reducing the memory footprint when executing
the estimators, the reduction proved to be insufficient to solve the original issue. Nonetheless significant improvements to the
existing implementation of R’s library and a good understanding of the estimation algorithms were achieved.
Leveraging the knowledge of estimation algorithms gained during the first attempt we rewrote a subset of the estimators in a
general purpose language. The language of choice for this effort was Python [vR08] and the mathematic library used was numpy
[Oli08]. Our implementation proved capable of handling MAWI traces in their full length.
4.4 Testing the implementation
A re-write of the algorithms contained in R’s fSeries library could easily result in an incorrect implementation. While speed and
memory consumption are important, insuring the correctness of the results is paramount.
An automated system was implemented to compare results from our library with results from R for all newly implemented
estimators. The automated tester program launches estimation of the same series in both R and our version of the algorithms and
then compares results. The test was repeated for a number of distinct traffic traces. For each trace tests were launched against
series of lengths ranging from 200 observations to about 1 million observations in steps of 100 observations. All of the estimator
functions passed the tests returning results that matched the expected values. These test results confirmed our confidence in the
correctness of our implementation relative to the reference library fSeries.
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Figure 4.3: Hurst parameter value estimated using different methods against the same traffic trace. The x axis represents the
number of observations used for the estimation, counting from the beginning of the trace.
4.5 Online estimation
The self-similar property of a time-series is defined for unlimited stochastic process and applies to the time-series as a whole. In
practical applications, time-series are of finite length, still, if the length of a series is large enough, it is acceptable to talk about
self-similarity of a finite series.
In our research we are interested in online monitoring of network traffic. This means that our self-similarity estimators need to
provide an approximation of the Hurst parameter for the traffic that is currently flowing through the estimation block.
An online estimator has two main features: the algorithm has to process new data as it submitted without requiring re-computation
on the whole dataset and it has to be designed in such a way that computation on a newly submitted block of data is finished
before the next block becomes available. Such algorithms are further discussed in the following sections.
4.5.1 Hurst parameter for current traffic
While the notion of current Hurst parameter value does not have any meaning even when relaxing the definition of self-similarity
for finite series, it can be assumed that current in this context means related to recent traffic. In this sense the value of H at time t
(Ht) is estimated, for the S series, using the finite subseries Sx: t-l<T(x)<t; where T(x) is the time-stamp of the observation x and
l is the lag or delay of the estimate. In other words, the last l seconds of traffic are used to estimate the value of Ht.
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Figure 4.4: Online estimation operates by taking into consideration only the last l seconds of the traffic flow.
The choice of l is mainly guided by two factors: quality of the estimate and acceptable delay. The quality of the H estimate
depends on the number of observations available in the time-series. The larger is the number of observations the smaller is the
estimation error. The maximum acceptable delay depends on the specific application, but usually cannot be longer than a few
seconds because the delay determines the lower bound for the reaction times of any algorithm based on the result of estimation.
l should be long enough to result in a small estimation error and short enough to make the results of the estimation useful.
To guide the choice of l it is useful to know how many observations are available per time unit. The number of observations
available per time unit depends on the traffic process model (see Section 4.2) chosen for the estimation. The inter-arrival process
model will produce a number of observations proportional to the average intensity of the traffic. The aggregate sizes process
results in a number of available observations that depends on the duration of the aggregation period duration.
4.5.2 Averaged Hurst parameter
The trade-offs involved in the design of network devices are such that strict constraint are imposed on computational and memory
resources. It is crucial to reduce resource consumption to a minimum for the implementation of self-similarity estimation based
techniques in such devices.
Even thought the series to be stored in memory is bounded by the choice of the estimation lag l, the number of observations
collected in l seconds can still be very large on high speed links. For instance, on a 100Mbit/s link the number of observations
for the inter-arrival process series is in the order of 106 per second. The execution time of estimator functions depends on the
length of the input and for most estimators it grows faster than O(n), where n is the number of observations.
To reduce the memory required by the estimation procedure the series of length l can be divided in K equally sized blocks. then
H* is defined as the mean of Hk over the last K blocks. The memory required to calculate H* is, at any point in time, a constant
proportional to the number of blocks K.
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Figure 4.5: Averaged Hurst estimator operates by averaging the H estimates for the last K blocks of the traffic flow.
The non-overlapping block mean estimate H* is used in [Li06] to detect variation of H in changing traffic conditions and a
variation, based on a weighted average, is described in [HKBN07] Section 3.5. The justification for its validity as estimator can
be found in [VA99a] Part I Sections D and E.
4.5.3 Averaged periodogram estimator
Using H* as described in Section 4.5 to reduce estimation memory requirements to a constant is applicable to any estimator
algorithm regardless of their design. While a generally applicable solution is very useful, it is also interesting to discuss modi-
fications to the same effect that apply to specific estimators. We stumbled upon such modification for the periodogram method
while re-implementing it. However, we make no claims as to the novelty of this modification, as a matter of fact a discussion of
a similar modification to the periodogram estimator can be found in [FA96] and in [PT97].
The standard periodogram estimator is based on a spectral analysis. The algorithm is quite straightforward (see [TTW95] Section
3.7): implementations calculate the power spectrum density (PSD) of the input time-series then employ linear regression on the
lower 10% of the frequency spectrum log-log plot excluding the DC component. The slope b of the linear regression determines
the Hurst parameter with the relation b = 1-2H.
Standard PSD Hurst calculation
Input series FFT() |x|^2 log-log rescalingPSD lin. regression Hurst Estimate
Figure 4.6: Standard periodogram estimator block diagram. Blocks are grouped to highlight the two stages of the estimation
algorithm: PSD estimation and Hurst calculation.
The algorithm con be split in two parts independent of each other. The first part is the signal’s power spectrum density estimation,
the second is the Hurst parameter calculation. This modification to the periodogram estimator is based on the fact that substituting
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the first part of the algorithm with a different, but equivalent, power spectrum estimation technique will not affect the validity of
the estimation result. However, the change of the power spectrum estimation method will influence the properties of the overall
estimator method.
We recall the goal of the modification is to reduce the consumption of memory and computation resources at runtime. In order to
do so, the first part of the estimator is substituted by the averaged power spectrum method due to Welch (see [Wel67]). Welch’s
method consists in dividing the input time-series in K potentially overlapping blocks then multiply each block with a window
function and compute the power spectrum density of the result using the Fourier transform. The resulting K power spectrums are
then averaged.
Welch’s PSD
Input series K block split w*xK FFT()K |x|^2K K block Avg()K PSD
Figure 4.7: Welch PSD estimation block diagram. This block can be used to substitute the standard PSD stage in Figure 4.6.
The result of Welch’s method is then used directly as an input for the Hurst parameter calculation stage of the algorithm. This
modification has the advantage to require little changes to existing software, in fact, the standard and Welch’s power spectrum
density estimation methods can be swapped in place.
Resource consumption of this modified periodogram method are lower than its standard counterpart. The memory required to to
store the power spectrum estimates is a constant dependent on the number of blocks K. The computation of the PSD for the K
blocks can also be executed in parallel if deemed advantageous.
Using the averaged periodogram method influences the properties of the Hurst parameter estimator. Averaging the PSDs of
overlapped blocks conserves the expected value of the estimates but reduces the variance of the estimates asymptotically by a
factor inversely proportional to the number of blocks K. The effect can be seen in Figure 4.3 comparing the plots of the standard
periodogram and the averaged periodogram (respectively per and avgper). The two plots overlap, but the avgper plot is smoother
and less subject to jumps.
The averaged periodogram was implemented and tested and is now part of our library of estimators.
4.6 Distributed computation
The next issue to overcome in preparation for our final simulation is estimation speed. While our implementation performs well,
mainly thanks to the fact that the entire dataset always fits in physical memory, we predict that the number of repetitions needed
by our final simulations coupled with the execution time of the estimators, some of which have computation complexity that is
O(n2) or O(n3), may result in an unacceptably long total execution time.
To reduce computation time we decided to leverage distributed computation. We attempted, and failed, to install third party
distributed job control applications on the department managed lab computers because of operating system environment incom-
patibilities. So we were forced to develop our own simple job scheduler and distribution application. Based on a client server
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architecture where the clients are constantly in a job execution loop either querying the controller for the next job or executing
the current one and the server schedules jobs and collects statistics and logs results from clients.
To test our implementation of the estimators together with our job distribution system we ran 8 estimators on a single MAWI
traffic trace and plotted the results on the same graph (see Figure 4.3).
4.7 Wavelet Estimator and Multiresolution Analysis
Of all the methods we tested, the wavelet estimator due to Abry and Veitch (see [AAVV98] and [VA99b]) is used in the rest of our
research. The reason for preferring the wavelet estimator is its intrinsic multi resolution analysis feature. This estimation method
leverages the properties of discrete multiresolution wavelet decomposition to approximate the value of the Hurst parameter.
Informally, wavelet decomposition divides a signal into a number of wavelets. Each wavelet that is part of the decomposition
of the original signal is a scaled and translated version of a so called mother wavelet function. Wavelet decomposition has the
advantage, over the classic Fourier signal transform, of being more suited for analysis of finite and non periodic signals like
time-series derives from network traffic.
Multiresolution analysis refers to a signal analysis technique that operates over multiple scales; the concept is strongly related to
wavelet decomposition (see [Mal89]). The signals we study are time-series so the term “multiresolution”, in our context, refers
to multiple timescales.
The Hurst estimator based on wavelet decomposition is the natural choice for performing MRA because its implementations
yield decomposition coefficients for approximately log2(N)-1-k scales, where N is the length of the input series and k depends
on the order of the mother wavelet function used for the decomposition and the intensity of border effects that reduce the number
of available scales. The decomposition coefficients for each scale are then used to calculate a signal power estimate for the
corresponding scale.
We use multiresolution analysis (or MRA) to verify the presence of self-similarity or evaluate the quality of a self-similar traffic
source. The result of applying MRA to a time-series can be visualized as a log-log plot (see Section 1.2 for details and Figure 1.5
for an example) of the power estimate of the wavelet decomposition coefficients at different time scales. The horizontal axis of
an MRA log-log plot displays the time scales; time scales are also known as octaves in the context of MRA because the time
base doubles from one scale to the next one up. The MRA log-log plot can be used to verify if a time-series is self-similar and
subsequently to estimate the value of the Hurst parameter.
We recall that formally self-similarity is a property that spans all scales and, in the ideal case, the value of the Hurst parameter
estimated at different time scales should be the same. This means that, in ideal conditions, all points of the MRA log-log plot lie
on a straight line.
We want to verify that the output of the generator is, at least form a practical point of view, self-similar. While the formal
definition of self-similarity requires the Hurst parameter to be the same across all scale, practically we accept a generated time-
series as being self-similar when its Hurst parameter is almost constant over at least 5 adjacent scales. The choice of 5 scales is
a pragmatic one. The minimum number of scales necessary to estimate a value of for H is 3. 5 scales is the result of extending
this minimum interval of scales by one scale in both directions.
DDoS detection based on traffic
self-similarity
41 / 100
4.8 Summary
Self-similarity estimator methods are algorithms that accept a time series as input and produce an estimate for the level of self-
similarity as the output. Most estimation algoritms are graphical in nature and were devised with small datasets (a few thousand
observations) in mind however, analyzing network traffic requires processing large datasets.
Captured traffic traces represent good testing datasets and are thus used for benchmarking the estimators. Traffic traces require
processing before being used as input to estimation methods. The processing discards most information contained in the traffic
traces except for the arrival times and sizes of data packets. Sizes and arrival times extracted form the traces are used to output a
time-series that represents either the inter-arrival process or aggregate sizes process.
We tested existing implementations and found the could not cope with the data sizes involved when analysing network traces and
proceeded to re-implement the estimators with large datasets in mind. We tested our implementation of the estimators thoroughly
to make sure they were correct and developed a set of simple utilities for distributed computation to support our benchmarking
effort.
After testing the estimators and evaluating a modification to the periodogram method, we finally settled for using the wavelet
based estimator for our research because of its multi resolution analysis features.
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Chapter 5
Traffic generation
Synthetic traffic generation is a wide area of research concerned with the theory and design of algorithmic generation of network
traffic. This area of research is driven by the need to simulate or emulate network conditions that are not easily reproducible or
for which existing traces are either not available or not easy to obtain.
Network traffic generation is, in purpose and methodology, not unlike test signal generation used in other engineering disciplines.
In both cases a synthetic signal, designed to have certain characteristics, is fed into a system as input and its effects are observed.
Since the nature of the test signal is known, the effects observed during the tests are more easily explained as a function of the
model and the test signal.
Test signal Unknown f(x) Output signal
Figure 5.1: Test signals like synthetic traffic can be used to map the unknown behaviour of a system.
Traffic synthesis algorithms, like test signals, are usually application specific: they are designed to fulfill the needs of a specific
research case. As a result, each traffic generation algorithm will reproduce specific features or properties of network traffic and
lack others.
5.1 Self-similar Traffic Generation
Our network model (see Chapter 2 for details) requires two independently controlled traffic generation blocks (see Figure 5.2,
reproduced here form Section 2.4). The two generators must be capable of synthesizing traffic that exhibits self-similar charac-
teristics. Also, to be useful for our simulations, each generator must also, at a minimum, expose two operational parameters:
traffic intensity and Hurst parameter.
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LT Source
+
AT Source
Rate Limiting queue Target sub-net
Figure 5.2: The complete network model. The two traffic sources for legitimate and malicious traffic (respectively labelled ‘LT’
and ‘AT’ in the diagram) are visible on the left.
Our interest is restricted to generation algorithms capable of approximating the self-similar characteristics of network traffic. Self-
similarity emerges in various aspects of traffic traces: aggregated sizes process, count process, packet inter-arrival time-series
to name some (see [AAVV98] and [HKBN07] for an overview of possible network traffic process definitions). Algorithmic
generation does not, in general, reproduce all of the above. As a result the choice of generator algorithm and estimation process
depend on each other.
In this research we use the two most common estimation processes: aggregated sizes process and inter-arrival time process.
Aggregated sizes process
Once a sample period is chosen, the aggregated sizes process consists in the time-series of octect count (or bit count) for each
sample period. In other words for each period we count the amount of data that is transmitted and at the end of the period we
output the result and reset the counter.
Inter-arrival process
The inter-arrival process, unlike the aggregated sizes process, does not require a sample period to be chosen. It simply consists
of the time series of the time-distance between the arrival of each packet and its successor.
The aggregated sizes process and inter-arrival time process require only packet time-stamp and packet size information to be
implemented thereby restricting the amount of information our traffic generator needs to reproduce. For instance source and
destination addresses, packet header flags, payload are irrelevant to our investigation. This is not only an advantage because it
simplifies the implementation of the generator but it is also the very reason why using self-similarity estimation is practically
attractive.
5.2 Online Generator Fitness Analysis
Our choice of the “alternating on-off sources” generator described by Taqqu et al. in [TWS97] is guided by two main factors.
First we prefer online generators to offline ones because the former allow us to reach higher level of confidence in simulation
results; and second the results from a recent empirical comparison by Horn at al. in [HKBN07] strongly suggest the generator
described by Taqque et al. is both simple in design and accurate in synthesizing self-similar traffic.
The offline category describes traffic generators that for technical reasons are required to run prior to the simulation. The length of
an offline traffic trace is determined before the simulation starts at the moment of its creation. The length of the trace ultimately
limits the execution time of the simulation. If the trace is shorter than necessary a new one needs to be generated and the
simulation repeated. To avoid this undesirable situation, a trace longer than the estimated required length can be generated. In
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some cases a precise estimate of the required length is not possible and finding a suitable length for a trace becomes a time
consuming trial and error exercise.
Online traffic generators produce traffic output incrementally as the simulation proceeds and allow to run a simulation for an
unconstrained amount of time. It is desirable to not have an upper bound on simulation time, because it allows to achieve higher
confidence on the results’ correctness.
The next sections describe the design and implementation of a multiplexed on-off online packet generator based on Taqqu’s work.
5.2.1 Multiplexed on-off sources generator
The multiplexing on-off sources generator works by superimposing traffic generated by many independent and strictly-alternating
on-off sources.
Alternating on-off sources are part of a broader family of generators called “packet-train” generators. A packet-train generator
(see Figure 5.3) emits packets during its activity (or “on”) periods and does not emit packets during idle (or “off”) periods with
no further restrictions on periods duration.
Idle (off) Active (on) Idle (off)
Time
Activity
Figure 5.3: Example Time-Activity graph for a packet train generator.
A strictly-alternating on-off source emits a packet train with the following restrictions: the “on” and “off” state strictly follow
each other and cannot be of nil duration, which means that a period of activity is always followed by a period of idling which is
always followed by another period of activity and so on.
The on-off period durations in each source for the multiplexing generator are Pareto distributed. In general the shape and scale
parameters for the “on” and “off” Pareto distributed periods can be different. Also the shape and scale parameters can be
different for each single source. The other parameter that governs the behaviour of the on-off source is the rate at which packets
are transmitted during the “on” period.
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Source #1
+ output
Source #2
...
Source #N
Figure 5.4: The multiplexed on-off generator internally aggregates traffic from N strictly-alternating on-off sources.
Assuming, for simplicity’s sake, all packets emitted have the same size and the content (header and payload) of the packet is not
relevant, then for a multiplexing generator with N sources the number of parameters involved is (2*2 + 1)*N: shape and scale for
“on” and “off” period plus packet emission rate, for each on-off source. The number of parameters is reduced to only 3 (Pareto
shape, Pareto scale and packet emission rate) when, following the approach suggested in [TWS97] and tested in [HKBN07], the
same value for packet emission rate, “on” period and “off” period distribution is used across all the alternating on-off sources.
When the generator is setup with the reduced set of three parameters then the self-similarity of the resulting generated depends
on the Pareto shape parameter, while the average traffic intensity depends on the Pareto scale and packet emission rate.
5.2.2 Implementing the generator
The implementation of the multiplexed on-off generator in our simulation framework is based on the reduced parameter design
explained in the previous section. The first of the three parameters is the number N of independent alternating on-off sources
that are used by the generator. Each one of the N on-off packet train generators is then initialized with the same two values for
the Pareto shape and emission rate parameters. The implementation is based on the source component template introduced in
Section 3.4 and its algorithm is based on a simple loop: when invoked to generate traffic for a given time-slice the generator will
iterate all N sources and instruct them to generate traffic for the current time-slice.
Example 5.1 Pseudocode for the multiplexed on-off sources generator
def process( eventHorizon ):
#Generate packets up until ’eventHorizon’
while self.nextPacketTimeStamp() < eventHorizon:
for onOffPacketTrain in sources:
eventHorizon = onOffPacketTrain( eventHorizon )
return min( eventHorizon, self.nextPacketTimeStamp() )
Each of the on-off sources will simply alternate between the on and off state and emit packets at the rate prescribed by the packet
emission rate parameter as explained in the previous section.
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5.2.3 Testing the generator
After some preliminary tests using MRA to evaluate the quality of the multiplexed on-off sources generator we realized we could
not reproduce the results published in Section 5.2 of [HKBN07].
The presence of bugs in our implementation was ruled out by running the same tests on a different implementation of the same
generator. These additional tests confirmed our results indicating that bugs were less likely to be the cause of the discrepancy.
We then decided to run extensive tests to map the effect of the generator’s parameters on its output. During preliminary tests it
was found that the parameters influencing the quality of the output are: Hurst parameter (controlled by the Pareto shape of the
on-off periods), the load level (ratio between Pareto scale for the on period and Pareto scale for the off period) and the number
of sources.
Mapping the quality of the generator’s output depending on the value of the three parameters listed above using MRA can be
achieved by pinning one of the parameters at a time and run multiple tests changing the values of the remaining parameters.
Table 5.1 lists, for each of the three parameters, the range of values used in the tests.
Parameter Range
H [0.55, 0.95]
Load [0.1, 0.9]
Number of sources [100, 10000]
Table 5.1: Multiplexed on-off generator test parameters
Results of the H vs load level tests for 1000 sources are potted in Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6. H vs load plots feature a reference fGn
trace as a reference plot of self-similar time-series. Ideally the slope of the each line in the plot should be close to the slope of
the fGn line. It is apparent from the plots that the load level does affect the slope of the MRA lines. The influence of load level
on the quality of the output is more intense for lower values of the Hurst parameter. Independently of the load level, the slope of
the MRA lines is consistently different from the expected value (the fGn reference) except for plots where the value of H is close
to 0.70 indicating that the quality of the generator is not homogeneous over the range of neither Hurst or load level parameter.
Results forH vs number of sources tests with a 0.25 load level are plotted in Figure 5.7. This set of plots highlight the relationship
between number of sources, H and the quality of the output. These plots, like the previous ones, feature a reference fGn line. The
results indicate that the number of sources does affect the quality of the generator, but does so in a marginal fashion at least in the
range of 100, 1000 and 10000 sources chosen for these tests. These plots confirm the influence of the H value on the generator’s
output quality: the slope of the generator’s MRA lines is closer to the slope of the fGn line for values of H in the midrange.
From the results of these tests we conclude that the multiplexed on-off generator is not well suited for our simulations because
of its non homogeneous output quality over the range of values for the Hurst parameter.
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Figure 5.5: MRA plot of fGn versus generated traffic with load = (0.1, 0.9) and number of sources = 1000.
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Figure 5.6: Continued from Figure 5.5. MRA plot of fGn versus generated traffic with load = (0.1, 0.9) and number of sources =
1000.
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Figure 5.7: MRA plot of fGn versus generated traffic with Hurst = 0.55(a), 0.75(b), 0.95(c) and load = 25%
5.3 Fractal Gaussian Noise Generator Fitness Analysis
Fractal Gaussian noise (also known as fractional Gaussian Noise or fGn) is one of the best known classes of stationary processes
with slowly decaying correlation and is, by definition, self-similar. Implementing a traffic generator using an fGn source is a safe
choice for obtaining “high quality” self-similar traffic. Nonetheless the transformation of an fGn time-series to the aggregated
sized process time-series may degrade its quality. To ensure the self-similarity is preserved we test our generated traces using
multi resolution analysis (see Section 4.7).
5.3.1 Implementing the generator
Our requirements for the generator interface are that it exposes two parameters: traffic intensity and Hurst parameter. The
generator derives its self-similar properties solely from the fGn noise source which will be programmed to produce an output
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time-series with a specific value for the Hurst parameter.
We use the fgnSim() function from the fSeries library of the R [fSC08] statistical analysis package to generate fGn time-series.
The fgnSim() function uses a spectral method based on [Pax97] to generate its output; the function’s parameters are: the number N
of observations in the output time-series and the value H of the Hurst parameter. Optional parameters control the mean (defaults
to 0) and standard deviation (defaults to 1) of the generated fGn.
H
fGn source Shaping
Intensity (bit/s),
Sample Rate (sample/s)
Aggregate sizes
series
Figure 5.8: Two stages of the fGn traffic generator. The first stage outputs fractal Gaussian noise. The second stage shapes the
noise into an aggregate sizes traffic process with the given average intensity and aggregation period equal to the reciprocal of the
sample rate.
We are then left with the problem of converting the fGn time-series into a traffic trace and controlling its output traffic intensity.
Our traffic traces are still time-series, but they represent the aggregated sizes traffic process. The simplest way of converting
an fGn time-series to a traffic trace is to interpret each fGn observation as the intensity of the traffic for a time period. Traffic
intensity is an integer number representing the total number of bits, octects or packets transferred in the chosen time-period.
As we mentioned above the fgnSim() function has an optional parameter to set the mean value of the fGn output. Simply setting
the mean parameter to the desired average intensity for the traffic source and rounding the result to the nearest integer would
result in an output time-series with the characteristics we require. For the sake of modularity we decide against this approach and
prefer to use the fgnSim() function with its default mean of 0 as a generator block. We then attach a post-processing block to the
output of the fGn source (see Figure 5.8).
The fGn post-processing block treats each value in its input time-series as the total amount of data transferred in a period in
accordance with our choice of aggregate size traffic process. Each observation is normalized with the value of the average
intensity parameter and rounded to closest smaller integer value. The rounding process alters the statistical properties of the
series, but we anticipate it will not affect our results because the value of the average intensity parameter is, for meaningful
scenarios, never lower than 106 thus making the quantization error smaller than 10-6.
5.3.2 Testing the generator
We know, from our previous tests on the online generator, that the output of the fgnSim() function is self-similar over a wide
range of scales. This is apparent when looking at the reference fGn plots in both Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.7. In all plots, across
values of H form 0.55 to 0.95, the slope of the fGn line appears constant (on a log-log scale) for at least the scales between 1 and
11, confirming our expectations.
In order to test that the self-similar properties of the fGn time-series are not altered by the conversion into an aggregated sizes
traffic process we proceeded to compare the MRA plots of the fGn before and after being processed by the second (shaping)
stage of the traffic generation process (see Figure 5.8).
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In the tests multiple fGn time-series of 220 observations each are generated using the fgnSim() function. Each time-series is
generated with a different value for the Hurst parameter in the interval from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps. The resulting nine time-
series are processed by the shaping stage to obtain nine self-similar traces. Each trace and its corresponding fGn time series are
run through MRA and their plots compared.
The plots do not show significant difference between the quality of fGn and the output of our generator. In fact the MRA plots
of the fGn time-series and the relative traffic trace overlap to the extent that they appear as a single plot. We conclude that our
implementation of fGn traffic generator is an acceptable source of self-similar traffic traces.
5.4 Summary
Our first choice for the traffic generator block was the “alternating on-off sources” generator described in [TWS97] and empir-
ically compared to other generators in [HKBN07]. Section 5.2 describes the reasons for preferring an online generator and the
subsequent analysis of its fitness.
After carrying out a thorough analysis of the “alternating on-off sources” fitness, we concluded that the generator, although
promising, was not suited for use under the conditions we are interested in reproducing in our simulations. We subsequently
decided to turn our attention towards an offline traffic generator. Using a well known source of self-similar time-series like
fractal Gaussian noise (or fGn) appeared to be a safe choice (see [Pax97]). In Section 5.3 we report our findings about the fitness
of fGn based traffic generator for our simulations.
Briefly, we found that our implementation of the fGn based traffic generator outputs good quality self-similar traffic over a the
required range of values for the Hurst parameter (0.5, 1.0) and over wide range of time-scales thus meeting our requirements.
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Chapter 6
Model Validation
Before proceeding with our investigation of DDoS detection, it is necessary to verify that our network model respects the re-
quirements we highlighted in Section 2.1. While in Chapter 2 we moved from requirements to design, justifying our steps via
reasoning and referencing existing literature, in this chapter we intend to “close the loop” by defining simulations which show
that our model reproduces the expected self-similarity related behaviour.
Simulations are computationally intensive tasks. The complete investigation of a model via simulation requires repeating runs
with all possible combinations of values for all of the model’s parameters. The number of such simulation-runs grows quickly
with the number of parameters, in a combinatory fashion, beyond practical acceptable limits.
A commonly used technique for reducing the parameter-space to an acceptable size, thus reducing the number of simulation runs
drastically, is to identify interesting simulation “Scenarios”. A “scenario” is a sequence of events (in our case: parameter-value-
change events) designed to exercise specific properties of the model under investigation.
In the context of this research, the use of scenarios is twofold: model validation and investigation of DDoS detection.
Model validation is achieved by defining simple scenarios designed to verify if the model reproduces the expected behaviour of
a real network.
6.1 Validation Scenarios
The simple scenarios described in the following sections are designed to validate the network model introduced in Chapter 2.
Validation consists in devising the simplest scenario that is expected to re-create a given behaviour. The validation scenario is
then run and results are observed to verify the presence of the expected phenomenon.
Validation scenarios are designed to exercise the only two non-trivial operating blocks of our model: traffic mixer and rate
limiting queue (see Figure 2.11). The other blocks in the model: links, sources and sink, do not require specific validation
because of their straightforward nature (although their are indirectly validated by the scenarios listed in the following sections).
Table 6.1 lists the validation scenarios and the traffic condition under which the test is carried out.
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Scenario name Condition(s)
Model conserves self-similarity (see Section 6.2) No congestion
Mixer block reproduces traffic super-imposition (see Section 6.3) No congestion
Model reproduces loss of self-similarity (see Section 6.4) Severe congestion
Table 6.1: Validation Scenarios
6.2 The model conserves self-similarity
This validation scenario aims at verifying that our network model does not alter the self-similar property of traffic that travels
from the sources to the target when no congestion is present.
6.2.1 Scenario setup
This scenario is setup by adding an H parameter estimator to the base model immediately before the target (see Figure 6.1).
LT Source
+
AT Source
(disabled)
T
H Estimator
Target Sub-netRate Limiting queue(disabled)
Figure 6.1: Network model setup for validation scenario number one: model conserves self-similarity
Only one of the potential traffic sources is used to avoid exercising the traffic mixer block which, in this case, acts as a
passthrough.
To satisfy the “no congestion” condition the rate limiter is disabled. When no limit is imposed on the link speed by the rate
limiter, the queue length is irrelevant and is left unspecified.
Multiple synthetic traffic traces with H values ranging from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps and an average intensity of 100Mbit/s are
used as traffic source. A simulation is run for each one of the traces.
Table 6.2 lists the parameter values used for this scenario.
6.2.2 Expected outcome
We expect the self-similarity estimator to yield a result close (within an estimator dependent tolerance) to the nominal value of
the H parameter for the test traffic trace.
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Parameter Value
Source 1 intensity 100Mbit/s
Source 1 H 0.55-0.95
Source 2 intensity nil
Source 2 H nil
Rate limit +inf
Queue length +inf
Table 6.2: Model conserves self-similarity scenario parameters
6.2.3 Simulation results
The traffic at the target is split into 256 sub-traces each 4096 observations long, the value of the Hurst parameter is then estimated
for each of the sub-traces and averaged. The variance of the H estimates is then used to compute the confidence intervals.
The process described above is repeated for all traffic traces and the results for are listed in Table 6.3. For each one of the fGn
traffic traces we list the mean value of H, its variance and the corresponding 99% confidence interval.
Nominal Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.5559 0.0002 0.0363
0.60 0.6105 0.0003 0.0407
0.65 0.6675 0.0002 0.0401
0.70 0.7202 0.0002 0.0416
0.75 0.7723 0.0002 0.0356
0.80 0.8260 0.0003 0.0408
0.85 0.8818 0.0003 0.0424
0.90 0.9332 0.0002 0.0389
0.95 0.9838 0.0003 0.0413
Table 6.3: Results for Model conserves self-similarity validation scenario
All nominal values fall within the confidence intervals of the corresponding averaged estimates according to our expectations for
this scenario. However the estimation process is accurate for traces with a nominal H value at the lower end of the range and
less accurate for traces with a nominal H value at the upper end. This is clearly visible in Figure 6.2 where the continuous line
represents the expected value for the Hurst parameter. The horizontal axis represents the nominal value of H for the traffic trace
while the results of the estimation are plotted against the vertical axis.
The lower accuracy of the estimator towards the upper end of the range could be caused by a number of factors, but likely related
to the small sample (4096 points) used to estimate H for each one of the sub-traces. We can rule out the network model from
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being responsible because the same estimation process run directly on the traffic traces yields the same numerical results as
Figure 6.2. At this stage, we decide to not investigate the causes because of time restrictions.
The width of the confidence intervals is a measure of our analysis tools resolution and will restrict the choice of values of H for
our DDoS simulations. When choosing Hurst parameter’s value pairs for the traffic sources care will have to be taken to pick
values for which the respective confidence intervals do not overlap. For instance: assuming the confidence interval half widths
are approximately 0.4 like in the results of this test, then the value pairs (0.55, 0.60) or (0.70, 0.75) would not be acceptable
because their confidence intervals overlap.
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Identity
Lower bound
Upper Bound
Results
Figure 6.2: Results for model validation scenario number one: model conserves self-similarity
6.3 The traffic mixer component conserves self-similarity of the traffic source
This validation scenario aims at verifying that the traffic mixer operational block of our network model correctly outputs the
superimposition of its two traffic inputs.
6.3.1 Scenario setup
This scenario is setup by adding an H parameter estimator to the base model immediately before the target (see Figure 6.3).
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LT Source
+
AT Source
T
H Estimator
Target Sub-netRate Limiting queue(disabled)
Figure 6.3: Network model setup for validation scenario number two: traffic mixer component conserves self-similarity
To satisfy the “no congestion” condition the rate limiter is disabled. When no limit is imposed on the link speed by the rate
limiter, the queue length is irrelevant and is left unspecified.
Multiple synthetic traffic traces with H values ranging from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps and an average intensity of 100Mbit/s are
used as traffic sources. In each simulation two traces with the same nominal H value and the same average intensity are used as
traffic sources.
The relationship between the two traffic source intensities should not affect the value of H of the mixed traffic. 100Mbit/s and
200Mbit/s were chosen arbitrarily. This validation scenario should succeed for any reasonable value for the intensities of the
sources.
Table 6.4 lists the parameter values used for this scenario.
Parameter Value
Source 1 intensity 100Mbit/s (any)
Source 1 H 0.55-0.95
Source 2 intensity 100Mbit/s (any)
Source 2 H same as Source 1
Rate limit +inf
Queue length +inf
Table 6.4: Traffic mixer component conserves self-similarity scenario parameters
6.3.2 Expected outcome
We expect self-similarity of the two traffic sources to be conserved by the traffic mixer component. The self-similarity estimator
measuring the Hurst parameter at the target should yield a result close (within an estimator dependent tolerance) to the nominal
Hurst parameter value of the two traffic sources. We also expect the average intensity of the resulting traffic to be the sum of the
average intensity of the sources.
6.3.3 Simulation results
The traffic at the target is split into 256 sub-traces each 4096 observations long, the value of the Hurst parameter is then estimated
for each of the sub-traces and averaged. The variance of the H estimates is then used to compute the confidence intervals.
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The process described above is repeated for all values of H in the range from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps. The results for are listed
in Table 6.5. For each one of the tests we list the mean value of H, its variance and the corresponding 99% confidence interval.
Nominal Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.5559 0.0002 0.0367
0.60 0.6122 0.0003 0.0409
0.65 0.6678 0.0002 0.0393
0.70 0.7192 0.0002 0.0353
0.75 0.7721 0.0002 0.0371
0.80 0.8267 0.0002 0.0391
0.85 0.8812 0.0002 0.0388
0.90 0.9331 0.0002 0.0392
0.95 0.9889 0.0002 0.0370
Table 6.5: Results for Traffic mixer component conserves self-similarity validation scenario
The results confirm our expectations: when the traffic from the two sources is superimposed, the H value estimated for the
resulting traffic is consistent with the nominal value for the sources.
In Figure 6.4 the continuous line represents the expected value for the Hurst parameter. The horizontal axis represents the nominal
value of H for the traffic trace while the results of the estimation are plotted against the vertical axis.
The discussion in Section 6.2.3 about the different level of accuracy at the two opposite ends of the range still applies to these
results.
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Figure 6.4: Results for model validation scenario number two: traffic mixer component conserves self-similarity
6.4 Congestion results in loss of self-similarity
This validation scenario aims at verifying that the rate limiting queue operational block of our network model causes loss of
self-similarity when traffic intensity is above the rate limit.
6.4.1 Scenario setup
The base model is setup for this scenario by adding an H parameter estimator immediately before the target (see Figure 6.5).
LT Source
+
AT Source
(disabled)
T
H Estimator
Target Sub-netRate Limiting queue
Figure 6.5: Network model setup used for validation scenario number three: congestion results in loss of self-similarity
Only one of the potential traffic sources is used for simplicity. Even thought using both traffic sources in our model would result
in the same effect, we prefer the simplest setup that is still capable or reproducing the desired effect.
Multiple synthetic traffic traces with H values ranging from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps and an average intensity of 100Mbit/s are
used as traffic source. A simulation is run for each one of the traces.
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The rate limiter is set to 90Mbit/s, 80Mbit/s and 50Mbit/s in three separate simulation runs to induce increasingly severe conges-
tion. The queue length is arbitrarily set to store a maximum of 2 seconds at 100Mbit/s (the traffic source rate) before packets will
start being discarded.
Table 6.6 lists the parameter values used for this scenario.
Parameter Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
Source 1 intensity 100Mbit/s 100Mbit/s 100Mbit/s
Source 1 H 0.55-0.95 0.55-0.95 0.55-0.95
Source 2 intensity nil nil nil
Source 2 H nil nil nil
Rate limit 90Mbit/s 80Mbit/s 50Mbit/s
Queue length 200Mbit 200Mbit 200Mbit
Table 6.6: Congestion results in loss of self-similarity scenario parameters
6.4.2 Expected outcome
When traffic with a known H parameter is forced through a rate limiting queue with a maximum bandwidth that is smaller than
the average traffic throughput we expect self-similarity estimated at the target host to drift away from the nominal value specified
for the traffic source.
6.4.3 Simulation Results
Results are grouped by rate limit in tables Table 6.7, Table A.2, Table A.3 and plotted in Figure 6.6. Each plot includes three
reference lines: an upper bound for the Hurst parameter, a lower bound for the Hurst parameter and the nominal value for the
Hurst parameter. The mean estimates are plotted with their confidence intervals.
The first group of simulations was run with a rate limit of 90Mbit/s and an average source intensity of 100Mbit/s. The plot
in Figure 6.6a shows how the means of the Hurst parameter estimates are closer to 1.0 compared to the results we obtained in
absence of congestion (see Figure 6.2) especially for traffic sources with values of H equal to 0.55, 0.60 and 0.65. The other
distinctive feature of the plot is the significant increase in confidence interval width compared to the results obtained in absence of
congestion. The increased width of confidence intervals is a consequence of the increased variance of the H parameter estimates
series. Variances listed in Table 6.7 are two order of magnitude grater than their correspondent values for the congestion free
scenario listed in Table 6.3.
The second group of simulations was run with a rate limit of 80Mbit/s and an average source intensity of 100Mbit/s. The results
plotted in Figure A.2 display further displacement of the means from the ideal value. Traffic sources with lower H parameter
values are more affected by the shift of the mean towards 1.0 similarly to the first group of simulations. The confidence intervals
are overall in the same order of magnitude as the first group of simulation, but comparing corresponding width in the first and
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second group we can observe the following three phenomena: as congestion becomes more severe the mean value approaches
1.0, confidence interval widths first increase with the onset of congestion then decrease once the mean value approaches 1.0, as
the rate limit increases the means and confidence interval for higher values of H become affected.
The third group of simulations was run with a rate limit of 50Mbit/s and an average source intensity of 100Mbit/s. The results for
this group indicate extreme congestion and the relative plot in Figure A.3 is effectively a series of points around the horizontal
1.0 upper bound for the Hurst parameter value. These results are compatible with the three phenomena mentioned in the previous
paragraph.
The shift towards 1.0 in the means of estimates observed in these simulations can be explained by observing that, informally, the
rate limiter operates by cutting peaks in traffic intensity while the queue levels the valleys. As congestion increases, the traffic
exiting the rate limiting queue becomes increasingly flat. In other words as the ratio between the source’s average intensity and
rate limit increases beyond 1.0, the variance of the average intensity measured after the rate limiting decreases. This condition
implies absence of self-similarity. Estimation of self-similarity is not applicable to a flat (non self-similar) traffic trace and the
result of 1.0 we obtain is a side-effect of the estimators’ implementation.
The widening of the confidence intervals observed in the simulations is the result of the estimation process. We recall that
the result’s mean H are obtained by averaging the estimates of sequential non-overlapping blocks of observations. In normal
conditions the Hurst parameter estimates for all blocks are similar and result in a small variance of the estimates series (see
Table 6.3). Under congestion each block is affected differently by the rate limiting queue: the block’s peaks and valleys are
flattened depending on its intensity, bursty-ness and the state of the queue. A block displaying self-similar features, before
entering the rate limiting queue, will partially or totally lose these features resulting in highly variable estimates for the Hurst
parameter and thus increasing the variance of the averaged estimates series.
The progressive nature of loss of self-similarity observed in the simulations suggests that traffic with a lower nominal H is
affected differently by congestion compared to traffic with an high nominal H. The reason for this phenomenon resides in how
the characteristic bursty-ness of self-similar traffic interacts the rate limiting queue. The rate limiting queue is composed of two
operational blocks connected as a cascade: a queue and a rate limiter. The overall effects of the rate limiting queue are the
result of the cumulative effects of the two operational blocks that constitute it. We have extracted a 4096 observations long block
from three traffic traces with different nominal values of the Hurst parameter: 0.55, 0.75, 0.95; and plotted a series of graphs to
highlight the effects of each operational block in a rate limiting queue. The plots are presented in three groups and each group is
composed by two rows. The first row in each group is an intensity VS time plot. The second row in each group is a log-log plot
of the trace displayed immediately above it and obtained with multi resolution analysis. The first group (see Figure 6.7) features
the traces in a congestion free scenario. In the second group (see Figure 6.8) the same traces are subject to rate limiting but no
queueing. In the third group (see Figure 6.9) the same traces are subject to both rate limiting and queueing. A Comparison of the
first rows of both first and second group of plots shows how the features of traces with different nominal values of H are affected
differently by rate limiting. Comparing the second and third group of plots we can see how the presence of the queue contributes
to erase all valleys from the trace with lower H while traces with higher H still possess some features.
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(b) Rate limit 80Mbit/s.
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(c) Rate limit 50Mbit/s.
Figure 6.6: Results for model validation scenario number 3.
Nominal Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.9977 0.0014 0.0975
0.60 0.9448 0.0229 0.3896
0.65 0.8244 0.0598 0.6301
0.70 0.8024 0.0366 0.4925
0.75 0.8395 0.0264 0.4186
0.80 0.9004 0.0095 0.2507
0.85 0.9351 0.0110 0.2698
0.90 0.9619 0.0145 0.3106
0.95 1.0033 0.0122 0.2843
Table 6.7: Results for Congestion results in loss of self-similarity validation scenario, case A
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(d) MRA log-log plot of (a) compared to an ideal H = 0.75 line.
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(f) MRA log-log plot of (a) compared to an ideal H = 0.95 line.
Figure 6.7: Traffic intensity plot (left) and MRA log-log plot (right) for a 4096 observations block with no rate limit. (a) and (b)
H=0.55. (c) and (d) H=0.75. (e) and (f) H=0.95.
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(a) Intensity vs Time. H = 0.55.
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(b) MRA log-log plot of (a) compared to an ideal H = 0.55 line.
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(c) Intensity vs Time. H = 0.75.
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(d) MRA log-log plot of (a) compared to an ideal H = 0.75 line.
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(e) Intensity vs Time. H = 0.95.
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Figure 6.8: Traffic intensity plot (left) and MRA log-log plot (right) for a 4096 observations block with 90Mbit/s rate limit and
no queue. (a) and (b) H=0.55. (c) and (d) H=0.75. (e) and (f) H=0.95.
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(b) MRA log-log plot of (a) compared to an ideal H = 0.55 line.
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(c) Intensity vs Time. H = 0.75.
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(d) MRA log-log plot of (a) compared to an ideal H = 0.75 line.
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(e) Intensity vs Time. H = 0.95.
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Figure 6.9: Traffic intensity plot (left) and MRA log-log plot (right) for a 4096 observations block with 90Mbit/s rate limit and a
200Mbit queue. (a) and (b) H=0.55. (c) and (d) H=0.75. (e) and (f) H=0.95.
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Chapter 7
DDoS Scenarios
With our model validated by the tests run in the previous chapter we are left with the last phase of our research. We begin our
discussion with the reduction of simulation parameters, both in number and in range. The number of parameters is reduced from
six to three for congestion free scenarios.
Subsequently we define and run simulation scenarios for the superimposition of two self-similar traffic flows with different values
of the Hurst parameter and different average intensities. The results are discussed in the next chapter.
7.1 DDoS Scenario parameters
The network model form Chapter 2 has a total of six of operating parameters, namely: traffic intensity and Hurst parameter for
each traffic source, length and maximum throughput for the rate limiting queue.
Parameter Unit Range
Source 1 intensity bit/s 0 to +inf
Source 1 H N/A 0.5 to 1
Source 2 intensity bit/s 0 to +inf
Source 1 H N/A 0.5 to 1
Rate limit bit/s 0 to +inf
Queue length bit 0 to +inf
Table 7.1: Network model parameters
The six parameters of the network model are listed in Table 7.1. Four of the six parameters (traffic intensities for both sources,
rate limit and queue length) are defined over an infinite interval. This is not desirable when trying to systematically cover the
whole range of value. The ideal situation would be to have a reduced set of parameters defined over a finite interval.
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We want to reduce the number of parameters upon which the simulation depends and, if possible, restrict their domain. In order
to do so, we first distinguish two classes of simulation scenarios: without congestion and with congestion and address them
separately.
7.2 Congestion-free scenarios
Scenarios without traffic congestion operate on a simplified model in which the rate limiting queue block is disabled like in
Figure 6.3. The two parameter related to the rate limiting queue do not apply and can be ignored (or set to +inf) thus reducing
the number of parameters from six to four.
When operating under the assumption of no traffic congestion there is no packet loss thus the resulting intensity of the traffic at
the target is simply the sum of the two sources’ traffic intensity: IT = I1 + I2. Since the absolute value of IT is not interesting
for our investigation we can chose an arbitrary value for I1 and define I2 / I1 = k. The case k = 0 is not considered relevant
because it reduces the network model to a single self-similar source which is already covered in the model validation scenarios
(see Chapter 6). The values for the k ratio are chosen to be symmetrical and centered around 1 from 1:10 to 9:10 and from 10:9
to 10:1 (see Table 7.3).
Reducing the number of value pairs for H1 and H2 is achieved by choosing equally spaced values in the range from 0.5 and 1.0
and by exploiting the symmetry in the network model as shown in Table 7.2: only the pairs marked by a star are used instead of
the entire matrix.
H1\H2 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
0.55 * * * * * * * * *
0.60 . * * * * * * * *
0.65 . . * * * * * * *
0.70 . . . * * * * * *
0.75 . . . . * * * * *
0.80 . . . . . * * * *
0.85 . . . . . . * * *
0.90 . . . . . . . * *
0.95 . . . . . . . . *
Table 7.2: H1 and H2 parameters value combinations
We have reduced the initial six to three free parameters. Also, all three parameters take values over a finite range of values (see
Table 7.4).
Two series of simulations are run. Each series based on a different scenario designed to observe the effects of self-similar traffic
superimposition. The first scenario is designed to exercise superimposition of traffic with the same intensity and different H
value. The second scenario exercises superimposition of traffic sources at different intensity ratios.
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Ratio k Ratio k
1:10 0.1 10:9 1.11
2:10 0.2 10:8 1.23
3:10 0.3 10:7 1.46
4:10 0.4 10:6 1.66
5:10 0.5 10:5 2.00
6:10 0.6 10:4 2.50
7:10 0.7 10:3 3.33
8:10 0.8 10:2 5.00
9:10 0.9 10:1 10.0
10:10 1.0
Table 7.3: Source-2 to Source-1 intensity ratios and corresponding k value
Parameter Unit Range
Sources intensity ratio k = I2 / I1 bit/s 1/10 to 10 (see Table 7.3)
Source 1 H N/A 0.5 to 1 (see Table 7.2)
Source 2 H N/A 0.5 to 1 (see Table 7.2)
Rate limit bit/s +inf
Queue length bit +inf
Table 7.4: Simplified network model parameters for congestion free scenarios
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7.2.1 Simulation Scenario-1 setup
For the first scenario we set I1 = I2 = 100Mbit/s and use values from Table 7.2 for H1 and H2. A simulation is run for each (H1,
H2) pair. The results for the 81 simulations are grouped by H value of the first source and listed in nine tables. The table and plot
for H = 0.55 are reproduced here while the remaining ones are reproduced in Appendix B to ease readability.
Parameter Value
Source 1 intensity 100Mbit/s
Source 1 H see Table 7.2
Source 2 intensity 100Mbit/s
Source 2 H see Table 7.2
Rate limit +inf
Queue length +inf
Table 7.5: Parameters for DDoS Scenario number one
7.2.2 Simulation Scenario-1 results
The plots display the mean H value with relative confidence interval measured at the target host and a linear regression curve.
The confidence intervals of the results for this scenario across all value pairs for the H1 and H2 sources are not different form the
results obtained with a single source during the model validation tests (see Section 6.2.3). This indicates that superimposition
does not disrupt self-similarity and our results are not less reliable when operating with two sources.
Figure 7.1a shows the results of the superimposition when one source is set to H = 0.55 and the other is changed to a different
value from Table 7.2 for each simulation. The plot displays quasi-linear behaviour up to H = 0.85 then the mean values of H
decrease instead of increasing. All plots for this scenario exhibit the same feature although the threshold where the trend changes
form increase to decrease is higher for plots with the fixed source set to an higher value of H. We can draw two important
conclusions from this: first superimposing traces with H1 > H2 results in a self-similar trace with H = HT and H1 > HT > H2.
Second the relation s : s(H1,H2) = HT is likely not linear.
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(a) 1st source fixed to H = 0.55, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
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(b) 1st source fixed to H = 0.60, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
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(c) 1st source fixed to H = 0.65, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
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(d) 1st source fixed to H = 0.70, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
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(e) 1st source fixed to H = 0.75, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
lin. regression
Results
(f) 1st source fixed to H = 0.80, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
Figure 7.1: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources.
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(a) 1st source fixed to H = 0.85, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
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(b) 1st source fixed to H = 0.90, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
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(c) 1st source fixed to H = 0.95, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in
0.05 steps.
Figure 7.2: Continued from Figure 7.1. Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition
of two sources.
Comparing the different plots we have obtained it appears that the slope of the quasi-linear portion of the graph is not constant.
To help us visualise the change in slope, the linear regression based on values for 0.55 <= H <= 0.85 was calculated for each
group of results and added to the plot. A standalone plot of the linear regression slope is reproduced in Figure 7.3. The slope plot
suggests that sources with a lower value of H contribute more to to the value of HT than sources with a higher H.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.5559 0.0002 0.0367
0.60 0.5832 0.0002 0.0399
0.65 0.6124 0.0003 0.0408
0.70 0.6376 0.0002 0.0365
0.75 0.6610 0.0002 0.0387
0.80 0.6821 0.0002 0.0385
0.85 0.6959 0.0002 0.0380
0.90 0.6935 0.0002 0.0385
0.95 0.6651 0.0002 0.0368
Table 7.6: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.55
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Figure 7.3: Slopes plot. The slope of the resulting curve for each of the simulations in this scenario. Values on the X axis are the
H of the fixed source.
7.2.3 Simulation Scenario-2 setup
For the second scenario we set I1 = 100Mbit/s and use ratios from Table 7.3 to control I2 intensity. This scenario uses (0.55,
0.75), (0.75, 0.95), (0.55, 0.95) value pairs for H1 and H2. A simulation is run for each (H1, H2) pair and each intensity ratio.
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H Slope
0.55 0.5083
0.60 0.5113
0.65 0.5175
0.70 0.5191
0.75 0.5513
0.80 0.5779
0.85 0.6299
0.90 0.7022
0.95 0.82
Table 7.7: Slope vs fixed source’s H
The results for the 57 simulations are grouped by (H1, H2) value pair and listed in 3 tables. The table and plot for (0.55, 0.95)
are reproduced here while the remaining ones are reproduced in Appendix C to ease readability.
Parameter Value
Source 1 intensity 100Mbit/s
Source 1 H 0.55, 0.75
Source 2 intensity 100Mbit/s
Source 2 H 0.75, 0.95
Rate limit +inf
Queue length +inf
Table 7.8: Parameters for DDoS Scenario-2
7.2.4 Simulation Scenario-2 results
The results of these simulations show that the intensity ratio between two sources with different H influences the resulting HT
at the target host: the resulting HT moves closer to the value of H for source with higher intensity. Similarly to the previous
scenario it appears that sources with lower H dominate over sources with higher H. From the plots it also appears that the relation
r : rH1,H2(I1, I2) = HT is not linear.
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(a) 1st source fixed to H = 0.55, 2nd source fixed to 0.75, intensity ratio from
1:10 to 10:1.
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(b) 1st source fixed to H = 0.75, 2nd source fixed to 0.95, intensity ratio from
1:10 to 10:1.
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(c) 1st source fixed to H = 0.55, 2nd source fixed to 0.95, intensity ratio from
1:10 to 10:1.
Figure 7.4: Results for simulation scenario number two. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources.
7.3 Non Congestion-free scenarios
Non Congestion-free scenarios use the rate limiting queue to simulate congestion conditions in the network. Because of the
unidirectional flow of packets from sources to the target, the traffic mixer and rate limiting queue are traversed by the traffic flow
in a sequential manner. In other words, the rate limiting queue is positioned such that it affects already superimposed traffic.
Intuitively the effects of the queue on self-similar traffic should be the same whether the traffic is the result of superimposition or
is coming form a single source.
Our preliminary simulations agree with intuition and the results from the validation scenario in Section 6.4. Because of the
redundancy of the results and time restrictions we do not proceed with a full series of simulations.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Conclusions
Our work is based on the results on distributed denial of service detection obtained by [AM04] and was prompted by the obser-
vation that, contrary to the assumptions made by existing literature, bot-nets could generate self-similar traffic.
Existing studies predict a decrease in the value of the Hurst parameter when non self-similar DDoS traffic is present. We changed
the underlying premise found in the relevant literature by assuming DDoS traffic is self-similar and used network simulations
to show how the superimposition of nominal and malicious traffic affects the Hurst parameter and potentially the feasibility of
DDoS detection based on self-similarity.
Using an analysis of bot-net worm payloads (see [DLD00]) collected on infected hosts we justified our claim that bot-net infras-
tructure can be used to generate self-similar DDoS traffic (see Chapter 1).
A simple model of a network reproducing the necessary features of a real network subject to DDoS was defined (see Chapter 2)
and later validated using simulations (see Chapter 6).
We selected, tested, modified and when necessary designed and developed software tools to carry out our simulations. DDoS
simulation scenarios were defined and run against the network model (see Chapter 7).
The results show that superimposition of traffic flows with different Hurst parameter values result in traffic with an Hurst param-
eter value that is a blend of the sources’ ones. The Hurst parameter value of the resulting traffic is influenced by both the H value
of sources and their relative intensities. The Hurst parameter value at the target HT is greater than the min(H1, H2) and smaller
than max(H1, H2). The influence of a source on the resulting value HT increases with his intensity relative to the other source.
There are also indications that sources with lower values of H tend to dominate in the resulting traffic self-similarity. The most
important result is perhaps the observation that, contrary to previous studies where DDoS traffic is non self-similar, the Hurst
parameter can increase in presence of attack traffic.
The other important observation we can draw from our results is that, in presence of congestion, self-similarity estimation
becomes unreliable and ultimately meaningless when congestion is so severe to completely flatten the traffic’s bursty behaviour.
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For an attack to be undetectable it would have to both generate traffic with a value of H close to the one expected at the target
and avoid network congestion while aiming at exhausting the target’s processing power (rather than its network bandwidth) by
sending well formed requests from non spoofed addresses. The value of H expected by the target changes in time and is, in
general, unknown by an attacker and not easy to recover. The attacker is required to send well formed requests if he/she wants
to occupy processing resources at the target and in order to do so it also requires to establish complete connection which are not
possible when the address field in packets is spoofed.
Detection of DDoS based on self-similarity estimation is more difficult but still possible in the light of our results. The Hurst
parameter value can increase as well as decrease because of a DDoS thus detectors need to be redesigned to take this into account.
Congestion is to be avoided because of its detrimental effects to traffic self-similarity. Avoiding congestion is at odds with the
very nature of DDoS and represents the weak point of self-similarity based DDoS detection techniques. On the other hand in
presence of congestion detecting DDoS becomes a non-issue because whether or not an attack caused the surge in traffic the
measures to be taken are identical.
8.2 Future work
Results of our investigation are limited by the precision of the Hurst estimators available to us. Estimation precision also affect a
DDoS detector design and performance and is therefore an interesting area for further research.
DDoS detection based on self-similarity is significantly affected by network congestion. An in-depth study of the effects of rate
limiting and queue length on self-similar traffic would be useful to establish a relation between level of congestion and reliability
of DDoS detection.
In the course of our research we have implemented and tested the self-similar traffic generator described in [TWS97]. The result
of our tests do not agree with neither the original paper nor an empirical traffic generator comparison conducted in [HKBN07].
The reasons for this discrepancy could be the lack of details about the numerous parameters involved in reproducing the condi-
tions of the other peers’ simulations. We believe it would be useful to invest time in reconciling these discrepancies. However,
thanks to our thorough testing we are confident that our implementation is correct.
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Appendix A
Validation scenario-3, results
A.1 Validation scenario-3 case A, results
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Figure A.1: Results for model validation scenario number 3A. Rate limit 90Mbit/s
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Nominal Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.9977 0.0014 0.0975
0.60 0.9448 0.0229 0.3896
0.65 0.8244 0.0598 0.6301
0.70 0.8024 0.0366 0.4925
0.75 0.8395 0.0264 0.4186
0.80 0.9004 0.0095 0.2507
0.85 0.9351 0.0110 0.2698
0.90 0.9619 0.0145 0.3106
0.95 1.0033 0.0122 0.2843
Table A.1: Results for Congestion results in loss of self-similarity validation scenario, case A
A.2 Validation scenario-3 case B, results
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Figure A.2: Results for model validation scenario number 3B. Rate limit 80Mbit/s
DDoS detection based on traffic
self-similarity
80 / 100
Nominal Mean H Var H 99% Conf. Int.
0.55 1.0009 2.8399e-29 1.3727e-14
0.60 1.0009 2.8399e-29 1.3727e-14
0.65 1.0009 2.8399e-29 1.3727e-14
0.70 0.9954 0.0030 0.1422
0.75 0.9838 0.0094 0.2497
0.80 0.9004 0.0523 0.5893
0.85 0.9295 0.0311 0.4546
0.90 0.9568 0.0281 0.4318
0.95 1.0100 0.0124 0.2868
Table A.2: Results for Congestion results in loss of self-similarity validation scenario, case B
A.3 Validation scenario-3 case C, results
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Figure A.3: Results for model validation scenario number 3C. Rate limit 50Mbit/s
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Nominal Mean H Var H 99% Conf. Int.
0.55 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.60 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.65 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.70 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.75 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.80 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.85 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.90 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
0.95 1.0009 1.5974e-29 1.0295e-14
Table A.3: Results for Congestion results in loss of self-similarity validation scenario, case C
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Appendix B
DDoS scenario-1, results
B.1 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.60
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Figure B.1: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.60, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.5832 0.0002 0.0399
0.60 0.6122 0.0003 0.0409
0.65 0.6409 0.0002 0.0372
0.70 0.6661 0.0003 0.0409
0.75 0.6884 0.0002 0.0365
0.80 0.7114 0.0002 0.0349
0.85 0.7262 0.0002 0.0378
0.90 0.7262 0.0002 0.0390
0.95 0.7049 0.0002 0.0348
Table B.1: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.60
B.2 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.65
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Figure B.2: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.65, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.6124 0.0003 0.0408
0.60 0.6409 0.0002 0.0372
0.65 0.6678 0.0002 0.0393
0.70 0.6940 0.0003 0.0409
0.75 0.7189 0.0002 0.0405
0.80 0.7415 0.0002 0.0412
0.85 0.7575 0.0002 0.0397
0.90 0.7607 0.0002 0.0389
0.95 0.7449 0.0002 0.0400
Table B.2: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.65
B.3 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.70
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Figure B.3: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.70, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.6376 0.0002 0.0365
0.60 0.6661 0.0003 0.0409
0.65 0.6940 0.0003 0.0409
0.70 0.7192 0.0002 0.0353
0.75 0.7437 0.0002 0.0383
0.80 0.7677 0.0003 0.0408
0.85 0.7872 0.0002 0.0393
0.90 0.7952 0.0002 0.0372
0.95 0.7838 0.0002 0.0355
Table B.3: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.70
B.4 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.75
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Figure B.4: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.75, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.6610 0.0002 0.0387
0.60 0.6884 0.0002 0.0365
0.65 0.7189 0.0002 0.0405
0.70 0.7437 0.0002 0.0383
0.75 0.7721 0.0002 0.0371
0.80 0.7988 0.0002 0.0372
0.85 0.8209 0.0002 0.0379
0.90 0.8328 0.0002 0.0402
0.95 0.8261 0.0002 0.0363
Table B.4: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.75
B.5 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.80
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Figure B.5: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.80, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.6821 0.0002 0.0385
0.60 0.7114 0.0002 0.0349
0.65 0.7415 0.0002 0.0412
0.70 0.7677 0.0003 0.0408
0.75 0.7988 0.0002 0.0372
0.80 0.8267 0.0002 0.0391
0.85 0.8536 0.0002 0.0347
0.90 0.8684 0.0002 0.0371
0.95 0.8716 0.0002 0.0352
Table B.5: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.80
B.6 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.85
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Figure B.6: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.85, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.6959 0.0002 0.0380
0.60 0.7262 0.0002 0.0378
0.65 0.7575 0.0002 0.0397
0.70 0.7872 0.0002 0.0393
0.75 0.8209 0.0002 0.0379
0.80 0.8536 0.0002 0.0347
0.85 0.8812 0.0002 0.0388
0.90 0.9036 0.0002 0.0387
0.95 0.9105 0.0002 0.0396
Table B.6: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.85
B.7 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.90
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Figure B.7: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.90, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.6935 0.0002 0.0385
0.60 0.7262 0.0002 0.0390
0.65 0.7607 0.0002 0.0389
0.70 0.7952 0.0002 0.0372
0.75 0.8328 0.0002 0.0402
0.80 0.8684 0.0002 0.0371
0.85 0.9036 0.0002 0.0387
0.90 0.9331 0.0002 0.0392
0.95 0.9496 0.0002 0.0402
Table B.7: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.90
B.8 DDoS scenario-1, fixed Source H = 0.95
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Figure B.8: Results for simulation scenario number one. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.95, 2nd source varying from 0.55 to 0.95 in 0.05 steps.
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2nd src H Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
0.55 0.6651 0.0002 0.0368
0.60 0.7049 0.0002 0.0348
0.65 0.7449 0.0002 0.0400
0.70 0.7838 0.0002 0.0355
0.75 0.8261 0.0002 0.0363
0.80 0.8716 0.0002 0.0352
0.85 0.9105 0.0002 0.0396
0.90 0.9496 0.0002 0.0402
0.95 0.9889 0.0002 0.0370
Table B.8: Results for Scenario-1 simulation with 1st source H = 0.95
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Appendix C
DDoS scenario-2, results
C.1 Intensity ratios scenario results (0.55, 0.75)
C.2 Intensity ratios scenario results (0.55, 0.75)
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Figure C.1: Results for simulation scenario number two. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.55, 2nd source fixed to 0.75, intensity ratio from 1:10 to 10:1.
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Ratio Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
1:10 0.9688 0.0003 0.0418
2:10 0.9302 0.0003 0.0417
3:10 0.8819 0.0002 0.0412
4:10 0.8342 0.0002 0.0405
5:10 0.7917 0.0002 0.0397
6:10 0.7559 0.0002 0.0390
7:10 0.7262 0.0002 0.0383
8:10 0.7017 0.0002 0.0377
9:10 0.6816 0.0002 0.0372
10:10 0.6651 0.0002 0.0368
10:9 0.6514 0.0002 0.0359
10:8 0.6359 0.0002 0.0360
10:7 0.6207 0.0002 0.0360
10:6 0.6061 0.0002 0.0361
10:5 0.5925 0.0002 0.0361
10:4 0.5803 0.0002 0.0361
10:3 0.5701 0.0002 0.0361
10:2 0.5624 0.0002 0.0361
10:1 0.5576 0.0002 0.0361
Table C.1: Results for simulation scenario number two. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.55, 2nd source fixed to 0.95, intensity ratio from 1:10 to 10:1.
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Ratio Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
1:10 0.7699 0.0002 0.0361
2:10 0.7631 0.0002 0.0367
3:10 0.7527 0.0002 0.0373
4:10 0.7400 0.0002 0.0379
5:10 0.7260 0.0002 0.0383
6:10 0.7116 0.0002 0.0385
7:10 0.6976 0.0002 0.0387
8:10 0.6843 0.0002 0.0387
9:10 0.6721 0.0002 0.0387
10:10 0.6610 0.0002 0.0387
10:9 0.6494 0.0002 0.0380
10:8 0.6374 0.0002 0.0382
10:7 0.6246 0.0002 0.0384
10:6 0.6111 0.0002 0.0385
10:5 0.5977 0.0002 0.0385
10:4 0.5847 0.0002 0.0383
10:3 0.5732 0.0002 0.0380
10:2 0.5639 0.0002 0.0374
10:1 0.5579 0.0002 0.0368
Table C.2: Results for simulation scenario number two. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.55, 2nd source fixed to 0.75, intensity ratio from 1:10 to 10:1.
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C.3 Intensity ratios scenario results (0.75, 0.95)
Ratio Mean H Var H 99% Confidence Interval
1:10 0.9776 0.0002 0.0415
2:10 0.9608 0.0002 0.0412
3:10 0.9384 0.0002 0.0407
4:10 0.9149 0.0002 0.0399
5:10 0.8931 0.0002 0.0391
6:10 0.8743 0.0002 0.0383
7:10 0.8585 0.0002 0.0376
8:10 0.8455 0.0002 0.0370
9:10 0.8349 0.0002 0.0366
10:10 0.8261 0.0002 0.0363
10:9 0.8191 0.0002 0.0378
10:8 0.8111 0.0002 0.0376
10:7 0.8034 0.0002 0.0374
10:6 0.7960 0.0002 0.0371
10:5 0.7893 0.0002 0.0369
10:4 0.7834 0.0002 0.0367
10:3 0.7787 0.0002 0.0364
10:2 0.7751 0.0002 0.0361
10:1 0.7730 0.0002 0.0358
Table C.3: Results for simulation scenario number two. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.75, 2nd source fixed to 0.95, intensity ratio from 1:10 to 10:1.
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Figure C.2: Results for simulation scenario number two. Hurst parameter value for superimposition of two sources. 1st source
fixed to H = 0.75, 2nd source fixed to 0.95, intensity ratio from 1:10 to 10:1.
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Appendix D
Acronyms
• DoS : Denial of Service.
• DDoS : Distributed Denial of Service.
• IP : Internet Protocol.
• ISP : Internet Service Provider.
• LAN : Local Area Network.
• LILO : Last In Last Out.
• LRD : Long Range Dependence.
• HTTP : Hyper Text Transfer Protocol.
• NIC : Network Interface Controller.
• OS : Operating System.
• UDP : User Datagram Protocol.
• RTT : Round-Trip Time.
• TCP : Transfer Control Protocol.
• WWW : World Wide Web.
• XML : eXtensible Markup Language.
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